

June 23, 1966

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — APPENDIX

A3389

Sunday film: "Stonehenge," lecture hall, 4. Inquiries concerning the Gallery's educational services should be addressed to the Educational Office, 737-4215, extension 272.

MONDAY, JULY 25, THROUGH SUNDAY, JULY 31

Painting of the week: Van Gogh. "La Mousmé" (Chester Dale collection), gallery 86, Tuesday through Saturday 12 and 2; Sunday 8:30 and 6.

Tour: Introduction to the collection, Rotunda, Monday 11 and 3; Tuesday through Saturday 11, 1, and 3; Sunday 2:30 and 5.

Sunday film lecture: "Chartres Cathedral." Speaker: Ann Watson, staff lecturer, National Gallery of Art, lecture hall, 4.

Continuing exhibition: "Art Treasures of Turkey." Ground floor. Through July 17. Circulated by the Smithsonian Institution Traveling Exhibition Service. Acoustiguide, self-contained portable electronic guide, available for rent.

Recent publications: Catalogue, "Art Treasures of Turkey." 240 pages, 9" x 9½", with essays by Machiel Mellink, Rodney Young, Paul Underwood, and Richard Ettinghausen, 3 color plates, and 129 black-and-white illustrations. \$3.50 postpaid.

Catalogue, "French Paintings from the Collections of Mr. and Mrs. Paul Mellon and Mr. and Mrs. Mellon Bruce." Second edition, 260 pages, 10" x 7½", with introduction by John Rewald, index, 20 color plates, and 236 black and white illustrations. \$4.50 postpaid.

Sunday film lectures: A series of lectures with films on analogies between Primitive and Modern Art will begin on July 10 and continue through July 31.

Week-end films: "Art in the Western World" will be shown in the auditorium on Saturdays at 2:15 p.m. and "The American Vision" on Sundays at 2:00 p.m. throughout the month.

LecTour: A radio lecture device is installed in 30 exhibition galleries. Talks, running continuously, cover most of the periods of art represented by the collections. A visitor may rent a small receiving set for 25 cents to use in hearing these LecTour broadcasts.

Gallery hours: Extended Hours. Through September 5: Weekdays 10:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m.; Sundays 12:00 noon to 10:00 p.m. Admission is free to the Gallery and to all programs scheduled.

Cafeteria: Extended Hours. Through September 5: Weekdays, Luncheon 11:00 a.m. to 2:30 p.m.; Snack Service 2:30 p.m. to 5:00 p.m.; Dinner 5:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. Sundays, Dinner 12:00 noon to 7:30 p.m.

VFW Chief Doubts Red China Will Enter Vietnam Conflict

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. RICHARD L. ROUDEBUSH

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, June 23, 1966

Mr. ROUDEBUSH. Mr. Speaker, the distinguished commander in chief of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, Mr. Andy Borg of Superior, Wis., has made many appearances since assuming the leadership of that organization nearly a year ago. He has won a reputation for being candid and forthright in discussion of public affairs. On June 16, 1966, he made a visitation to the Department of Arkansas, and as always his remarks were of great value in their printed reference to the situation in Vietnam. I, therefore, submit a newspaper article covering the text of

his remarks, so that all Members may be aware of the statements made:

VFW CHIEF DOUBTS RED CHINA WILL ENTER VIETNAM CONFLICT

The commander in chief of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States here Friday ruled out the possibility of Red China entering the Viet Nam war.

Andy Borg of Superior, Wis., also called for "total victory" in the Southeast Asian conflict, in an interview prior to Friday's opening session of the 35th annual convention of the state department of the VFW at the Velda Rose Tower.

The VFW commander said his belief that Red China would not enter the war was based on eight reasons, "many of which were given to me by Chiang Kai-shek when I discussed the matter with him on Formosa."

He then listed his reasons as follows:

"One, Red China is in economic difficulty.

"Two, if Red China entered the war we would bomb her atomic installations immediately and she is very desirous of preventing that so she can perfect the atomic bomb.

"Three, because of the feud between Red China and Russia, she does not have the parts to repair her war machine which was furnished by Russia.

"Four, if Red China entered the war, we would give air support and naval support to Chiang Kai-shek and that is the last thing that Red China would want—to have Chiang Kai-shek get a foothold on the mainland of China.

"Five, the war in South Viet Nam is a peninsular war and we control the sky and sea, and Red China would have difficulty in getting men and supplies in to South Viet Nam, and we would not make the same mistake we made in Korea by not bombing the sources of supply.

"Six, the Vietnamese people do not desire to have Red China in Viet Nam any more than any other outside power. There is a long-lasting dislike of the Chinese by the Vietnamese people.

"Seven, Red China would not have anything to gain by entering the war because at the present time they are fighting the war with North Viet Nam soldiers without the loss of face and men and supplies.

"And eight, there is an internal struggle going on within the Communist regime to determine who will succeed Mao Tse-tung."

Borg then lashed out at Sen. J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT and asked the Senator to "give his reasons for believing that Red China might enter this war."

The VFW commander said, "I don't know what Senator FULBRIGHT stands for."

Borg, a former district attorney, said Sen. FULBRIGHT should step down and let others ask him questions. "I certainly would like to ask him questions as a trial lawyer." Sen. FULBRIGHT is chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

He said he would like to know just what the Senator advocates in the Viet Nam war.

The commander-in-chief said he believed both Sen. FULBRIGHT and Sen. WAYNE MORSE of Oregon, a critic of the Viet Nam war, "should go to Viet Nam and see for themselves."

Pointing to a quote attributed to the Arkansas senator as saying the United States was "arrogant," Borg said "this country has been good to him myself and everyone. I have never called my country arrogant."

Asked his views on possible peace talks with the Red Chinese leaders, the VFW commander said the U.S. should fight with the idea of "total victory" in the war.

"By using our power," he said, we would have a much better chance of peace talks with them than by this so-called graduated escalation.

"We've announced we will talk. Now it's up to them."

He was quick to point out, however, as Washington had said "there is no substitute for victory."

During his address of the state VFW delegation, the commander again called for "a big and fast step-up in the U.S. war effort in Viet Nam."

Borg urged a four-point program in stepping-up the U.S. war effort.

"Cut-off free world and Communist-block shipping into North Viet Nam by blockade and if necessary, mining the Haiphong harbor.

"Bomb fuel supplies and other military targets in the Hanoi area.

"Destroy railroad communications between Red China and North Viet Nam.

"Build-up U.S. troop strength in South Viet Nam."

The commander also said "the VFW fully supports the stronger action being taken by the Johnson Administration in South Viet Nam. The VFW believes that the United States has no choice but to win this war."

"To do so requires patience, perseverance and power. We must prove to the Communists and to the free world that we have, as a nation, these indispensable ingredients for victory."

An Editorial in Support of the International Education Act of 1966 by Henrietta and Nelson Poynter, St. Petersburg (Fla.) Times, June 19, 1966

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. JOHN BRADEMAS

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, June 22, 1966

Mr. BRADEMAS. Mr. Speaker, I insert in the RECORD a most thoughtful editorial describing the International Education Act of 1966, which the House of Representatives passed on June 6, 1966, and which is now awaiting action in the Senate.

This editorial, which appeared in the June 19, 1966, issue of the St. Petersburg, Fla., Times, was written by two distinguished journalists, Henrietta and Nelson Poynter.

The editorial follows:

NEEDED: GREATER UNDERSTANDING

College students next year may take a hard look at new, demanding courses that can lead to careers overseas working for their government, international organizations or business and banking enterprises.

Congress has toyed with the idea of a "West Point of Diplomacy" and other schemes to train officers for the Department of State. But the U.S. Senate now has a bill—already passed by wide bipartisan support in the House—to make better use of existing institutions of higher learning to train the thousands of Americans needed to do the wide diversity of chores of a world power which has had greatness and responsibility thrust upon it.

"The Ugly American" was an overdrawn novel about the thousands of our countrymen in foreign enclaves who had neither the desire nor capacity to understand the people of the country to which they were assigned.

The International Education Act is designed to help find and stimulate young Americans with the urge to know the world—not just to travel it. Our guess is that such a program will solve the dilemma of many an

A3390

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — APPENDIX

June 23, 1966

educated young woman who may find a rewarding spouse and a career too.

A program of federal aid to stimulate the study of agriculture, started more than a century ago, has paid off in bounteous crops beyond the dreams of those who originated it, as well as important research in fibers and new products.

Since the first Russian Sputnik went orbiting in 1957, the federal government has poured money into most of our colleges and universities to stimulate scientific and technical specialties. The International Education Act is recognition of our critical need for new skills not only in the language of the tongue but empathy and understanding of the aspirations and needs—and strength and limitations—of the bewildering variety of people who make up the rest of our world.

President Johnson has pushed this specific bill by speeches and special messages. When he was a member of the Senate he worked toward better educational facilities for those especially interested in Asia. His work has been effective. Only two members of the Florida delegation—JAMES HALEY of Sarasota and ROBERT SIKES of Crestview—voted against the new act.

Its two principal sections authorize graduate centers for research and training which may be set up regionally by several universities and grants to colleges and universities and grants to colleges and universities for comprehensive programs at the undergraduate level. The bill also amends the Defense Education Act to cut out the limit of "50 per cent" support for language and area study centers and deletes the provision that such centers be limited to teaching languages for which adequate instruction was not readily available in the United States.

As JOHN BRADEMAS, Democrat of Indiana, the floor leader of the House bill explained, this does not mean that colleges have to teach Czech or Tagalog to qualify. There is great need for languages like French and Spanish too. All of this "will help to bring the nation's educational system into line with the responsibilities of the United States in the world community, and with the new realities of an increasingly interdependent world."

The federal funds would supplement existing grants from public and private non-profit agencies and encourage exchange programs for teachers and students—such as the Mexican study group at Florida Presbyterian College.

By coordinating the activities of various government agencies in the field of international studies in a special branch of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the bill could utilize the skills of Americans returning from the Peace Corps, Fulbright fellowships and other programs, as well as government and industry experts in a various areas of the globe.

The results hoped for from this bill as stated in the debate are:

The exposure of nearly all undergraduates to some substantial international studies, particularly in relation to non-Western areas.

The integration of international studies into the curriculums of our universities as central, not peripheral concerns.

The provision of an effective international dimension in as many departments and professional schools of our universities as appropriate and possible.

The encouragement of inter-institutional arrangements among groups of colleges and universities to support effective programs in international study.

But of prime importance, in the minds of the congressmen, is the potential for peace in this legislation. Rep. CARLETON SICKLES, Democrat of Maryland, who has worked all through the Far East, and whose wife was born in Shanghai, summed it up for his colleagues with:

"Only by really knowing the peoples of other lands, their hopes, their problems—not as we see them, but as they see them—can we really develop the mutual understanding upon which permanent and lasting peaceful relationships can be based. There is no greater cause than this."

Florida-Colombia Alliance Program: A Progress Report

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. DANTE B. FASCELL

OF FLORIDA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, June 22, 1966

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Speaker, I am extremely pleased to announce that Florida's exciting partnership with Colombia under the Alliance for Progress is being expanded to include the Republic of Venezuela. Florida Secretary of State Tom Adams spoke in Tallahassee on June 16 and announced that the State-to-nation program has been so successful in its first 33 months of operation that "we are now ready to take another important step in making this an effort of true hemispheric proportions."

Florida's new partnership with Venezuela will begin with a student exchange program. The first Venezuelan graduate students will arrive in Florida in September.

Mr. Speaker, problems of hunger, disease, and illiteracy continue to plague our hemisphere. But through the ever increasing scope of activities such as the Partners of the Alliance the war against the deepest causes of instability can be won.

PROGRESS REPORT: FLORIDA-COLOMBIA ALLIANCE PROGRAM
(By Secretary of State Tom Adams, June 1966)

Now that 33 months have elapsed since the Florida-Colombia Alliance was initiated, it is appropriate that we stand back from our work, appraise our efforts thus far and take a brief look at where we hope to go in the years ahead.

In a very real sense, the Florida-Colombia Alliance constitutes a unique approach to international good will and assistance programs. It was one of the first "state-to-nation" programs embarked upon in the United States. It combines the talents of government, private organizations and individuals of both nations. It is generated not by monetary gifts but by an exchange of people, ideas, talents and technical know-how. It is built on the premise of helping our good hemispheric friends to help themselves and on the recognition that in return, we have much to gain from their rich culture and new technology as well as from commercial exchanges. For only in such a way can be built mutual respect and truly friendly relations between the peoples of the Americas.

Because our approach has been new and different, the Florida-Colombia Alliance has, by design, sought to move slowly and deliberately in the initiation of our programs. For us, it has been a case of learning to crawl before we could walk; of gaining experience before we could embark on ambitious ventures.

As a result, I am pleased to report that we have succeeded in establishing a sound base. The Florida-Colombia Alliance is now a strong, dynamic and growing concern. With active state-wide committees established in both Florida and Colombia, we are ready to move forward with increasing effectiveness in the areas of education, agriculture, civic organizations and sister city affiliations. In addition, new committees are soon to be appointed to guide our efforts in public health, culture, tourism, commerce and public administration.

RÉSUMÉ OF ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Education

College Scholarships

The Florida Board of Regents has authorized a total of 15 graduate level scholarships each trimester at State universities for deserving Colombian students under the Alliance program. As well, more than a dozen Florida junior colleges have pledged more than 45 scholarships to Colombian high school graduates. In return, leading Colombian universities, including Los Andes, National and Valle, have granted reciprocal scholarships on a matching basis to Florida students.

During the first sixteen months of these reciprocal scholarships, a total of 47 Colombian students were placed in universities and junior colleges in Florida. In January, 1966, the first three Florida students began classes in Colombian universities.

Study-Travel Program

An 8-week study and travel program was organized by the Alliance and the Experiment in International Living in Bogotá for 15 Florida junior college students beginning in July, 1966. The major colleges of the Colombian Department of Cundinamarca have developed a special six-week course in Spanish, Latin American History and Literature, for which no enrollment fees are being charged.

Technical Assistance

Through the Alliance, Dr. Harvey K. Meyer, Director of Research in Teaching at Florida Atlantic University, went to Colombia this year to advise on the establishment of academic programs at the Universidad del Norte, a new, private technological institute scheduled to open in Barranquilla in July. On a contract to the university, Dr. Meyer surveyed facilities, interviewed professors, developed curriculums and recommended necessary textbooks.

Public health

Medicines Dispatched

On July 20, 1965, Colombia's Independence Day, the Alliance delivered 500 pounds of urgently needed medicines and medical supplies to the Children's Hospital in Barranquilla to combat an epidemic of dehydration. As a result, the hospital director reports that the lives of many young children were saved. Similar pleas from other hospitals and clinics are also receiving an affirmative response by Florida-Colombia Alliance Committees.

Health Survey

A detailed public health survey was conducted along the north coast of Colombia through the auspices of the Alliance. The consequent report is providing the basis for continued development of health programs in that area.

Agriculture

Soil Kits

Early in 1965, soil testing kits and materials to assist in plant disease recognition and control were dispatched to the Secretary of Agriculture in the Colombian State of Atlántico.

Cattle Short Course

The Alliance Agriculture Committee arranged for the issuing of formal invitations

A3376

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — APPENDIX

June 23, 1966

ment should not have to base the bed-rock of its promotion on the free help of key people from DMAA, Time, Inc., Readers Digest and McCall's.

Two years ago, The Department and Congress should have looked at this new product, ZIP Code, and hired themselves a first class advertising agency to produce a continuing, believable advertising program. From a practical matter, though, no self-respecting agency would have touched such a product until they saw that the product was ready for market. The product may finally be ready by the end of this year. A paid-for advertising program will sell the public, sell business, sell the employees, point everyone in the same direction with some confidence that this is a going concern. If 1% of sales is the formula, \$60,000,000 is needed for the project.

This whole subject is grist for another treatise on the need for government to recognize that marketing should be paid for to get best results, just as government must buy trucks, and buildings, and computers, and scales, and postage meters.

Be that as it may, we have all learned a valuable lesson in government. And we hesitatingly continue to believe that our present ZIP Code system is a reality, colored by the obvious fact that we need something to move the mail in the years ahead. We should try to make it work. We apparently must look to Congress, however, to work out a carefully written law and remove this important system from regulation, a law which also defines perimeters beyond which The Department cannot go in making demands for sorting and sacking. There is a solution. There must be. You can do your part by understanding, experimenting, reporting your findings to Congressman ARNOLD OLSEN, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., 20515 and to Frederick C. Belen, Deputy Postmaster General, Post Office Department, Washington, D.C., 20260. You will want to send carbons to your associations, and if you think of it, to this reporter. We'll continue to look, listen and report our findings to you. But your participation is urgently needed.

Coal Research

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF**HON. JOHN P. SAYLOR**

OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, June 23, 1966

Mr. SAYLOR. Mr. Speaker, inasmuch as I was author of the legislation that established the Office of Coal Research, I have attempted to keep informed on the progress of that office and its various projects.

Last year I visited a facility in Cleveland where beds of coal are used to filter sewage, and I have since noticed increasing interest in this project on the part of both Government and industry. Once the coal has served its purpose as a filtering agent, it can be burned under boilers with little loss of Btu content.

I have also toured the Bituminous Coal Research Laboratory in Monroeville, Pa., where experiments under OCR auspices as well as numerous industry-sponsored studies are taking place. Last week it was my pleasure to inspect the laboratory of Gourdine Systems, Inc., in Livingston, N.J. This facility has recently been awarded an OCR contract

to conduct research in electrodynamic power generation, through which it is hoped that large volumes of electricity will be produced without the use of conventional generators and turbines.

The success of the Gourdine project would not only reduce air contamination—currently one of coal's major problems—but also increase efficiency in power production and eliminate the need for large water supplies at electric plants. With an assortment of air pollution control regulations now facing the coal and oil industries, it is mandatory that new combustion techniques be developed as soon as possible.

The Federal Government and some large municipalities have suddenly adopted or threatened such stringent regulations on smoke, fly ash, and sulphur emissions that even the most modern combustion equipment cannot guarantee the coal-burning plants will meet requirements. Certainly the electric utility industry has made outstanding progress in reducing atmospheric pollution, and the coal industry has invested in multimillion-dollar preparation plants to remove impurities before the product goes to market.

Only an all-out research program can advance the cause of air pollution control to a point where it can meet some of the new standards proposed or already adopted. OCR's projects to develop competitive synthesis fuels from coal show exceptional promise, and coal's bright future will be assured if the Gourdine process proves successful.

allowed out is accurate. I must confess, however, that I have little confidence in those whose spokesman has enunciated the official "right to lie" and recently has jibed at Vietnam reporters who expect officials to tell them the truth. But all this is somewhat beside the point of what I intend to say.

Mr. Speaker, thus far this has been the most mismanaged war in the history of the United States as a sovereign nation. It is a sad thing when our soldiers have to write home from Vietnam to ask to get a pair of shoes, tents, when ammunition supplied our allies in Europe has to be bought back at a profit to the holders and then flown to Vietnam; when a small American command has to ask General Ky's headquarters in Saigon before making a local attack on an assembly of Vietcongs, when military helicopters are summarily requisitioned in the battle area to carry civilian supplies, and when the record shows that 70 percent of supplies reaching Saigon by ship are not military supplies at all.

Whatever happens in the future, the American people are not going to forget or forgive the massive mismanagement of a war in which their sons, husbands, and fathers are fighting and dying.

New Economic Myths

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. AL ULLMAN

OF OREGON

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, June 23, 1966

Mr. ULLMAN. Mr. Speaker, the stability of our economy today is being threatened by skyrocketing interest rates. The inflationary pressures of increased money costs are being reflected in the price of many consumer goods. At the same time, the homebuilding industry is being adversely affected by the drain from the mortgage market. I am concerned that these and other irregularities are not receiving the required attention from the administration. Decisive action is needed to bring interest rates within the zone of safety to permit a continuation of our economy's record expansion.

In the accompanying article from the Washington Post of June 19, Columnist Joseph Kraft recalls the efforts of the late President Kennedy in expressing the distinction between myth and reality in economic affairs. Today, reality demands that the accelerating trend to higher interest rates be halted and reversed before it imposes an unbearable burden on our economy.

New Economic Myths

(By Joseph Kraft)

At Yale four years ago, President Kennedy made his famous distinction between myth and reality in economic affairs. President Johnson has at all times shied away from that distinction. And now there are signs—faint but unmistakable—that the mythmakers are staging a comeback.

The focus of the distinction between myth and reality, of course is the role of the Fed-

June 23, 1966

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — APPENDIX

A3375

At the May 19 hearings, quite a case was made for including all towns in a new directory. In my tours around the country, one of the most frequent complaints I heard from people using the directories is that they can't find the number for many towns and for addresses based on building names. There are between 91,000 and 122,000 communities, political entities, what-have-you, in the United States. If you live in Muttontown, Long Island, New York, you cannot find your number in the directory. It is served by the Syosset Post Office and carries the 5 digit number of Syosset. The Post Office's position has been that the postal delivery address is the right address on mail, not the name of the prestige community which has no post office. When you realize that there are only 38,000 post offices serving 122,000 "communities" you begin to see how incomplete the directory is in terms of a useful tool for the public.

While the Post Office takes this restricted view of addressing, they dare not press the issue officially. They know that Congress would be sensitive to the public's cry if their community's name was forbidden in a postal address. The situation has been aggravated by The Department's program in recent years of closing 3rd and 4th Class Post Offices. I'm told that there used to be nearly 90,000 offices. But now there are approximately 33,000 plus branches.

Good news may be on the way, though. The Postmaster General at his news conference on May 19 announced that instructions are being issued to all postmasters to arrange to supply ZIP Code information by telephone on a regular basis during normal business hours. To be of necessary service, all post offices will need to have the ZIP Code number for every community of the land, which means that a new directory, with complete and accurate information, is going to be needed. The Department agreed at the May 19 hearing to take this under study. If they now agree to the change, it will be many months before this 4th revision can appear.

They will also need to study the quantity needed. Hundreds of thousands are needed at windows, switchboards, on public writing counters. (This weekend I walked into a post office and spotted a directory chained to a writing counter in the lobby. But was horrified to see that it was a copy of the first directory issued in 1963, thoroughly out of date including the numbers for the 643 delisted multi-ZIP Coded cities.) Enough new directories will be needed to supply the millions of reference points in businesses around the country. There are 4,000,000 businesses in these United States, plus government. Large national mailers need many copies throughout their organizations. Point is, that in this critical area alone, we are simply not ready for January 1967.

Closely related to this is The Department's computer tape. It does not work. It does not contain every community. It does not recognize The Department's own imposed standard abbreviations for cities and states. It does not help computer owners with zones in multi-ZIP Coded cities. This was brought out in hearings by Norman Carroll, computer expert Holy Ghost Missions, Stanley Woodruff of Ed Burnett, Inc. and Myron Kaufman of Publishers Clearing House. They also pointed out many clerical errors in the tape. The proper tools have yet to be supplied to those who face a mandatory date in seven months.

SORTING AND SACKING

But if you think the numbers are bad, wait until you grapple with sorting and sacking. Those of you who read our weekly newsletter, *Friday Report*, already know about the discovery of recent weeks. All of us have been told repeatedly that there are 552 sectional centers and many have assumed that there are, therefore, 552 first three digits assigned out of a possible 999.

Fact is, The Department has assigned 930 first three digit numbers. The importance of this does not show until your mail is sorted and sacked according to current regulations. In order to properly prepare mail to 552 sectional centers, you must know which three-digit number goes to which sectional center. If you do not have enough mail tied out to five digits, to make a third of a five-digit sack, you must place these bundles in the right three-digit bag, which can mean either a sectional center or a multi-ZIP Coded city (Chicago—606).

Important here is that there are 189 sectional centers which shepherd two to five first-three-digit numbers totaling 265 across the country, or 454 three-digit-problems. Add to this 398 sectional centers involving just one three-digit number and you see that we are dealing with 852 sectional centers. To this must be added more three digit numbers reserved for the military and other purposes.

What does this mean? Greensboro, North Carolina, a sectional center, shepherds five first three digit numbers—270 to 274. If you discover that you do not have enough town bundles, tied out by five digits beginning with 274 to make a direct town sack, you must determine whether you have enough bundles to make a third of a sack for all towns whose numbers begin with 274. If not, the mail handlers will have to know that 274 bundles must be sacked to 270. The same would apply to 273, 272 and 271. This complication far exceeds the ability of the mailhandler to scoop finished mail coming off a conveyor belt, and "compute" where this goes.

Thus, those who have been experimenting with sorting and sacking are finding that they must specially code the finished list-run to tip off the mail handler what he is to do. A list in numerical sequence must be hand coded, preferably in red, with three to five different sacking symbols, or the mailing process slows to a snails pace with confusion, frustration and pyramiding costs. Those on computer are figuring several ways of adding a code during the addressing run. We have seen several. But those on old fashioned equipment must do it by hand after every list run. This was not told to us in the early diagrams put out by the Post Office Department to prove simple compliance. This is nowhere described in diagrams being handed out at meetings right now.

We have been mailing this magazine under the regulations as they are now written since February. The list is in numerical sequence. In consultation with the Duluth Post Office and the Minneapolis Regional expert, our plant determined that our list of labels in continuous form needed to be coded in red by hand, with five different symbols at every change in number, depending on what needed to be done with the bundle. And every month. Our plant claims it takes a girl 13 hours for this chore, and must be done if the conveyor belt is to maintain any decent speed. It really must be done on lists from a computer print-out, if some sort of symbolism isn't added during the addressing run. And here, I am told symbols are hard to see at high speed.

This system was confirmed in my visit to Lane Publishing, Menlo Park, California in May. They publish *Sunset*. Have 700,000 subscribers. Their plant notified them that they would not mail the magazine unless their "print-out" from Speedamat plates was marked in red with symbols. It has meant three extra people for the week during which the magazine run is made on five addressing machines. And every month.

This dissertation is in part news to you. But another purpose is to make the point that few know about this yet. The Department is just beginning to recognize the significance of this to the mailer mailing nationally,

regionally, or significantly beyond the borders of a single town. Is a change indicated? What will happen to the thousands upon thousands of mailers who have not been privy to association bulletins, to our writings, to the meetings held for a hundred here and a hundred there? We anticipate chaos of immense proportions.

I am informed, much to my dismay, that this situation was fully discussed at a meeting of the Postmaster General's Technical Advisory Committee about a year ago. Why wasn't this problem brought back for discussion in association bulletins at that time, so that at least the insiders could go to work on exploring the problem. Why was this apparently a surprise to The Department at recent hearings? What can be done now in seven short months?

Exemptions? Or extensions for hardship cases? This was likewise thoroughly explored at the May 19th hearing. Harry Maginnis, Lee Epstein and Manny Cohen of Mailmen, Inc., Syosset, spoke at length about the potential inequities of that system; that it opened the door to 33,000 different opinions from 33,000 postmasters; would create a situation of slow, bureaucratic decisions. And by what guidelines? We're having a tough enough time getting the right numbers and reasonable sorting and sacking requirements. Isn't the real solution a compromise version of Arnold Olsen's original bills making the ZIP Code system a law, not a regulation; and delaying the program through the device of a reward for those who have fought this thing through and can make it, or a slight penalty to those who can't comply because of no real fault of their own? We think so.

One of the reasons *this reporter* decided to testify on May 4 was to make three points: (1) The Post Office Department did not appreciate the enormity of the problem for business in accepting a revolutionary filing system to replace many age-old ways of conducting business clerically. They miscalculated the time it would take for all of business to get ready. While the concept of ZIP was first announced in November 1962, the rules of the game were not made known until February, 1965, barely 16 months ago, after several years of repeated statements by The Department that ZIP would be voluntary.

(2) The ZIP Code system did not stabilize soon enough. The sweeping changes at the beginning of this year in which 643 multi-ZIP Coded cities were delisted to single ZIP status is a case in point. So is the continuing, innocent changes being made in Multi-ZIP Coded Cities. The numbers finally need to be frozen, changes made systematically and everyone notified in a systematic way.

(3) The ZIP Code program is in trouble because of inadequate promotion in two important areas: (a) a massive training program for 600,000 postal employees; (b) a massive advertising and promotion campaign beamed to every corner of the land.

A real training program is desperately needed. We understand a manual has been written and sits on a Department desk. And has for some months. But The Department says it has no money to hire the large training staff, the tools and materials needed to get all employees talking the same language. The Department is apparently gun shy of Congressional Appropriation Committees. So the program sits. Consequence is that many business users of the mail, searching for answers, come away from their post offices with confusing interpretations and a feeling that the postal "experts" know less about the problems than questioning mailers.

Part II of an educational program is the real need for a paid advertising program to the public, produced by the smartest possible marketing team. Needed . . . an Asst. Postmaster General for Marketing to sit beside the ones for Transportation, Operations, Facilities, Personnel and the new one to be, Research and Development. The Depart-

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

June 23, 1966

the demise predicted for them; it is still the locus of governmental faith, hope, and charity.

There is little indication that the local government omelet can be unscrambled. The urban county, interlocal contracting, voluntary councils of elected officials, responsible regional development districts, liberalized annexation, municipal incorporation control, metropolitan planning, supervision of special district activities, and residual home rule powers; these will all help prevent the local government situation from getting worse, or at least slow down the rate of fragmentation. But this may be the best that can be hoped for in the way of intra-metropolitan action.

Buckminster Fuller has expressed shock at the realization that in the field of international relations, "continuation of the weapons race and of cold and hot warring are motivated only by intramural party fears of local political disasters. The world's political fate does not rest with leaders at the summit, expressing the will of world people, but with the local ambitions and fears of lower-echelon political machines . . . All political machine professionals of all political states will always oppose loss of sovereignty for their own state. Solution of the impasse, if it comes at all, must clearly come from other than political initiative."⁶²

Substitute for the world's fate, "the metropolitan area's fate," and we have a picture of interlocal relations today. Unfortunately for international relations, there is nothing comparable to the Federal and State governments to help keep things manageable.

Much political, professional, and administrative talent will continue to be expended just to make the interdependent metropolitan area work. At a minimum, each metropolitan area will need some form of regional governmental machinery, most likely taking the form of a council of elected officials and staffed by a regional planning unit, a regional citizen information-education-response system and an integrated regional fiscal plan, to meet agreed-upon regional goals.⁶³

All three levels are developing a more discriminating form of cooperative federalism⁶⁴ to meet the needs and realities of government in metropolitan areas. In a governmental system of shared functions, frictions and anomalies will occur. There are no basic defects, however, in the federal system itself. It has met all of the challenges but one—the Civil War. The system will continue to serve for a long time to come in meeting the problems of race riots, water shortages, traffic congestion, and increasing crime rate, and contaminated air. There are no ultimate solutions in either human or governmental affairs. Consistency in urban development will, in Emerson's words, "continue to be the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers." The responsibility of the students and practitioners of government in keeping the system in good working order will be to help locate and oil the squeak points as they appear.

*REPORT BY ERIC SEVAREID ON
SOUTHEAST ASIA*

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, on Tuesday evening, June 21, the distinguished commentator, Mr. Eric Sevareid, made a personal report on the CBS television network. Mr. Sevareid is well

known to all Americans for his penetrating observations over many years to the people of this country on most of the important issues about which all of us are concerned.

He recently spent a month in southeast Asia and this personal report of what he found is one of the best balanced and most objective analyses of the situation that prevails in that unhappy area that has come to my attention.

I believe that what Mr. Sevareid said about this tragic situation will be of interest to Senators and to people of the country. Therefore, I ask unanimous consent that his remarks be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the report was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Vietnam: A PERSONAL REPORT

(By Eric Sevareid)

(Below and on the pages that follow is the full text of the CBS News' "Vietnam: Eric Sevareid's Personal Report," scheduled for broadcast Tuesday evening, June 21, on the CBS Television Network. Mr. Sevareid videotaped the broadcast shortly after returning from several weeks in Vietnam followed by a swing through Asia that took him to Hong Kong, Thailand, Japan and Formosa. Text may be reprinted in full or in part, with credit to CBS News.)

Good evening. I'm Eric Sevareid.

I propose to sit here for the next thirty minutes and talk about America in Asia, about war and about truth. This may set television back a long way. We'll find out.

I am not an authority on Asia. Asia is far too big, changing far too rapidly for many certainties.

I am not an expert on war. There is no such thing as military science. War is a rude art, in which human character, will and faith play at least as great a role as figures and logic.

About truth, I hope I know more. It is a reporter's business to tell appearance from reality, rhetoric from fact.

He often fails. In this Vietnam war, he fails unusually often. Because he is normally a stranger to the land, its language and its people. And because at every level—military, political, economic, psychological—the truth is fragmented in a thousand pieces. At each level it is a jigsaw puzzle that no single man is able to piece together. We are therefore confronted with an extraordinary condition: no honest man can return a convincing answer to the great and obvious questions that all men ask:

Is our action there insurance against eventual war with China, as the administration asserts, or is it increasing the risk of such a war? Will the Vietnamese pull themselves together, politically, or fall further apart? Are we winning this war? Do we have a clear strategy for winning it? How many years and men will it take?

To each question, the official rhetoric of Washington gives the optimistic response. These officials speak from faith, not fact. The total of the known facts does not deny their optimism; but it does not confirm it, either.

Through this fog of uncertainties the reporter must pick his way; he must report out of instinct, experience and impression. He can guess, estimate, and try to project what seem to him the probabilities.

And his first task is to break through the crust of his own pre-conceived notions.

I think I was only dimly aware of what the American power in the Pacific world really means. As you fly the great arcs to Alaska and Japan, and down the eastern rim of Asia's land mass, you begin to under-

stand. The vast Pacific and the skies above it belong to American power. America—its men, money and machines—is intermingled with the affairs of governments everywhere, the daily lives of hundreds of millions of people.

Consider the world of the Pacific Ocean and the southern seas in this American era:

Alaska—30,000 military men.

Hawaii—100,000 military men.

Guam—20,000 military men.

Okinawa—25,000 military men.

Japan—39,000 military men.

Korea—55,000 military men.

Taiwan—10,000 military men.

The Philippines—25,000 military men.

Vietnam—about 285,000 military men.

Thailand—20,000 military men.

Besides, of course, the Seventh Fleet itself—60 to 70,000 men.

This is the legacy of the defeat of Japan in World War Two; of the take over of China by the communists; of the collapse of European rule; of the Korean war; and now, of the fighting in Vietnam. It is also the legacy of habit, of the military man's fear of ever giving up any salient, of the idea that Communist China is bent upon military aggression, as were Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia.

There is a strange phenomenon that comes into play in the relationship between impressions and reality. It has to do with time and space. For distance lends, not only enchantment, but apprehension. So, to Americans at home, the Buddhist riots in Saigon means that all Saigon is in turmoil. But the man sitting in a cafe a block from the riots is relaxed; he knows it's not. So, to us at home, China appears a frightening monster, straining at the leash, eager to smash her neighbors.

But some of her neighbors are far more relaxed than we. This is true of the government of Japan, the most powerful non-communist society of eastern Asia. Their view of China as an aggressive threat is closer to the view of Senator FULBRIGHT than to that of Secretary Rusk.

They believe that China is already contained. She is contained by the existence of the nuclear bomb, by the simple knowledge that if she marches over the border of a friendly country that we are able to help, we shall immediately help. She is contained by this gigantic ring of steel built by the United States along her eastern and southern borders and by Russia's ring of steel along four thousand miles of her western borders. If she feels encircled, no big power ever had more right to feel that way. She fears what the United States may do more than some of her neighbors fear what she may do.

China can try the methods of subversion in Southeast Asia, she has and she does. But it is doubtful how successful she would be, even without our presence and resistance in Vietnam. Nationalism is basically stronger than any ideology. Most nations are not dominoes, that fall over with a click. These nations of Southeast Asia, like Thailand or Burma, are more like sponges.

Their edges can become waterlogged with Communist-trained resistance groups, but there are a thousand natural obstacles to the water seeping through the whole organism. One is the historic dislike and distrust of the Chinese throughout these regions.

A crucial question is whether our resistance in Vietnam is preventing the spread of Chinese dominance in other Asian countries, through their propaganda, infiltration, subversion.

The administration points to Indonesia where the powerful, Chinese-inspired Communist apparatus was smashed not long ago. That would never have happened, they like to think, were we not there, in Vietnam.

⁶² The New Yorker, January 8, 1966, p. 93.

⁶³ See "The State of the Region," President's Annual Report Delivered to the Board of Trustees of the Metropolitan Fund, Inc., Detroit, Michigan, January 26, 1966, p. 5.

⁶⁴ Henry C. Hart, "The Dawn of a Community-Defining Federalism," The Annals, May 1965, p. 149.

June 23, 1966

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

13481

these agreed-upon goals, an examination might then be made of the present and needed performance of the whole range of urban functions to be followed by development of a Metropolitan Workable Program. Such Metropolitan Workable Program would be multi-program, multi-jurisdictional, and include procedures to assure that before any local government in the metropolitan area would be eligible for any Federal aids that they be a party of the workable program agreement. The plan would include a politically responsible comprehensive planning process, an integrated regional fiscal capital program and budgetary plan, and agreed-upon variety of land development control mechanisms. Federal incentives to such a cooperative regional effort would have to be high and might take the form of cash contributions of unearmarked grants to help meet regional budget needs not available through existing sources. Federal aids for councils of governments and the grant incentives for metropolitanwide projects in the Metropolitan Development Title of the Urban Development Act proposed by the President are steps in the direction of a metropolitan goals effort.

Metropolitan party organization

The classic functions of political parties in the United States are to provide leadership, to crystallize issues and to reconcile diverse community and private interests. These functions are precisely what are needed in our metropolitan areas today. In the not too distant past, parties were well organized from the ward to State party organization. But patronage has declined, and governmental programs today, as a matter of right rather than party favor, increasingly meet peoples' needs for assistance. Local political party organization in metropolitan areas today is simply a pale reflection of the existing pattern of local government.

One approach recently suggested in the Philadelphia metropolitan area called for a supplementing of the existing local party structure "with a unit which will attend to the political realities of today's inter-county, inter-state, super-city . . . Within the inter-county—inter-state area encompassed by urban Philadelphia, the Republican Party was represented by three men seeking seats in the U.S. Senate. Though largely facing the same problems and all campaigning within the area of influence cast by such factors as TV, there was no coordination of candidate or party activity. A minimum of coordination could have improved each campaign and could have saved money through volume purchases of time and space."

Such a council, the proposal goes on, could develop programs in a multitude of critical areawide problems, including transportation, water resources, housing, zoning, and race relations. A similar effort is underway in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area. These political leaders understand the importance of the metropolitan area to their party's future, both in terms of the proportion of the vote cast in metropolitan areas and in terms of growing urban problems. This approach has application in both parties. It can revitalize and widen the horizons of the existing central city political machine and add structure, professionalization, and form to today's suburban political efforts.

Public use of the private sector

The private corporation has many of the attributes of an ideal metropolitan government. It can operate across jurisdictional and even State boundaries. It generally has broad legal authority to perform an almost unlimited variety of functions and has always attracted the bulk of the managerial and professional talent of the country. It has broad borrowing power. Its potential excesses can be controlled by government regulation. And, finally, the private corporation, like the

public official, is concerned with citizen reaction to its activities, "its image." These qualities should make the private corporations especially attractive to governmental officials at all levels to help carry out their programs. Many Federal agencies have already, in effect, created their own private corporations, e.g., Rand, Institute for Defense Analysis. Other agencies have done likewise, but more covertly.

A number of contracts have been let under the Economic Opportunity Program with major industrial corporations to operate Job Corps training centers. The corporations diversify their activities while OEO taps their managerial resources for public purposes.

The State of California has let contracts with some of the Nation's aerospace corporations to examine the feasibility of attracting urban problems through the scientific and systems approaches developed by these firms in helping carry out the Nation's defense and space programs. Taking a leaf from this experience, Lyle Fitch of the Institute of Public Administration predicts "the development of public-private 'consortiums' to meet urban social and physical needs. Government . . . might contract with industry for entire systems or urban services."⁶⁰

Given a high degree of competence and concern with the protection of the public interest on the part of government contractors, industry is in a strategic position to make major contributions in such previously exclusive public sectors as crime and delinquency control, government information, economic development, and water supply and sewage disposal.

CONCLUSION

The current trends in the role of government in urban development might have been described in the paradoxical opening lines of Dickens' "A Tale of Two Cities":

"It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity; it was the season of light, it was the season of darkness; it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair."

The role of the Federal and State governments continues to grow. They are helping local government do what local governments cannot do very well for themselves; raise adequate revenues and do it equitably, achieve economies of scale, administer regional programs, and provide a forum for the resolution of conflicting interests.

A new dimension in Federal and State aids is likely to be demanded by local government. In an age of \$100 billion Federal budget, civil rights groups are calling for an added \$40 billion a year to "aid economic development and racial justice in the Nation's large cities." The lesson of this new dimension of proposed financial aid will not likely be lost on urban interest groups developing a strategy for the future.

The role of the Federal Government will continue to be that of acting when it is the only agency with the necessary resources, when the needed activities cannot be handled within the jurisdictional limits of smaller governmental units, when nationwide minimum standards are justified, when State, local or private groups are likely to take action that injures the interests of people in other States, or when basic political and civil rights are impaired.⁶¹ The vitality of the Federal response to urban problems—in voting rights, education, poverty, increased housing choice, and planning—has been demonstrated. Its role will be increasingly pragmatic and less vulnerable to tradi-

tional arguments for limitations on Federal action. It will administer little directly other than the Post Office, national parks, and veterans hospitals.

Until now, the States in the Federal Union have exercised relatively unlimited autonomy in four major areas of governmental activity: (1) the administration of election machinery and the prescription of voter qualifications in State and local elections; (2) the financing and administration of the public schools; (3) maintenance of law and order; and (4) maintenance of independent tax systems. Pressured by sins of commission and omission in a handful of States, the Federal Government in 1965 entered three of these previously reserved fields in substantial manner, through the Voting Rights Act (P.L. 89-110), the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (P.L. 89-10), the Law Enforcement Assistance Act (P.L. 89-197), and establishment of a National Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. If the Heller Plan becomes the Johnson Plan, the Federal Government will enter the fourth previously exclusive area. And once public responsibility revolves upward it rarely devolves again.

Federal programs will continue to use the States, sometimes as a channel as in "701" planning assistance to smaller communities, a priority-setting body as in sewage treatment and hospital construction grants, a planning body as in the Federal-Aid Highway program, a partner as in the River Basin Commission title of the Water Resources Planning Act, and an approving body as in the Land and Water Conservation Fund. In large part, these differences in administrative relationships reflect subtle adaptation to political and administrative necessities, but in larger part arise from piece-meal decision-making and past patterns of behavior. Still needed is a Federal philosophy and broad doctrine on the role of the States in Federal assistance for urban development.

The States will continue to be an indispensable part of the system for a number of old reasons and for a number of new ones. The States do avoid a concentration of power, facilitate a wide participation in government, provide yardsticks and laboratories for experimentation, serve as an outlet for local grievances and for political aspirations, permit administrative decentralization and distribution of work load, allow for diversity and regional adaption, and help protect our two-party system. The State has ample powers and financial resources; it exists, therefore it will be used. It will increasingly be called upon to perform the functions of regulation, leadership, technical and financial assistance, and removing archaic restrictions on local government. With no sign of metropolitan government in sight, the governor's office and the legislatures will increasingly serve as a place of arbitration and for developing understanding among suburban and city dwellers, and among the sometimes competing metropolitan area populations within the same State.

As for local government, like Shakespeare's Cleopatra, "Age cannot wither her, nor custom stale her infinite variety." It is the place where the buck stops, where ultimately most public services will be administered, and where almost all public funds, however collected, will be spent. The role of local governments in urban development will not be tidy, or even efficient, in an accountant's sense.

On the other hand, physical and administrative tidiness (and even economy) is not the only if indeed the principal test of desired urban development. The local community action agencies spawned by the Economic Opportunity Act measure their success in part by the disruption of the status quo. Jane Jacobs (and in our hearts we know she's right) has made an effective case for the central cities being a long way from

⁶⁰ Architectural Forum, January-February 1966, Vol. 124, No. 1, p. 94.

⁶¹ Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, "A Report to the President for Transmittal to the Congress" (1955), p. 84.

June 23, 1966

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

13483

If this is true, all of us would all feel very much better about this war in Vietnam. My personal opinion is that that is not true. Indeed, it was the conclusion of Japan's ambassadors to Southeast Asian countries, in recent consultation, that Vietnam had nothing to do with those events in Indonesia, that internal, domestic pressures alone were responsible.

Korea in the north, Thailand in the south are exceptions to this line of thought. The men who rule Thailand have thrown in their lot with the United States and its argument. Contrary to Burma on their west, Cambodia on their east, they do fear China and Communism in general, and they have given welcome and facilities to American power.

The Thai government tries to keep as much of all this as secret as it can; and we help them in this out of diplomatic consideration. For the truth is that we have upwards of twenty thousand military men in Thailand, mostly on the great bomber bases from which we hit North Vietnam and the Ho Chi Minh trail. Reporters are not permitted to see these bases. Twenty thousand is more men than we had in Vietnam itself when Mr. Johnson became the President.

Our military wanted, at one time, to put ground combat units into Northeast Thailand where skirmishes go on with Chinese trained guerrillas. Our diplomats stopped that; but we have more than a few special forces advisory and fighting teams in the Northeast. And there one sees how war tends to spread and of why military men must be kept in constant check by political men.

Laos, technically neutral by the Geneva Agreements, is thoroughly engulfed in the war already. The North Vietnamese run their supplies and fresh soldiers through much of Laos and therefore we bomb it constantly. We admit to no men on the ground in Laos. My information from people I consider reliable, is that we have several thousand soldiers inside Laos, including spotter groups and special forces teams. When an American is killed in or over Laos, his death is officially registered as having occurred in Vietnam.

Cambodia is becoming more and more deeply involved in the fighting. We have bombed and shelled Cambodian territory, more than once, for some time back because we have had to. I believe our front line intelligence reports and our eyewitnesses. When General Larsen, Commander of our second corps, whose boundaries lie along the Cambodian line, said there are heavy North Vietnamese troop concentrations inside Cambodia—I am inclined to believe him rather than the Pentagon's immediate denial of this. After all, he is on the scene.

This, then, is how war spreads—in spite of all the official proclamations that we shall not allow it to spread.

War has a logic, a momentum, imperatives of its own. And in this process, language is adulterated, reason twisted, policy follows in the wake of actions, instead of the other way around, and the inner sequence of cause and effect is lost to men's comprehension.

(And so,) the administration argues that unless we stop communism, or China, or both in Vietnam now, other nations will fall, as happened in Europe in the thirties, until the grand confrontation of World War Three with China will be forced upon the world.

It seems to me that it is quite as logical to argue that our very presence in Vietnam, with this inevitable osmotic spread of hostilities across other borders, is just as likely to produce war with China, unless we are extremely careful and extremely lucky. And if that happens, it will be like World War One, if not World War Two; men still argue how World War One got started, as actions led to reactions and still further reactions,

engulfing nation by nation. And if we are sucked into collision with China in these regions, we will never be sure of the precise point in space or time when it happened. How the Vietnam war goes will be the test of all this; Vietnam is the anvil on which our future relations with vast, emerging China are being hammered out, and the sparks fly in all directions.

Until we got into it, the Vietnam war was essentially a civil war; a civil war and a social revolution and a struggle for national identity and freedom from European rule.

For legal and diplomatic reasons, Washington must argue that it is not a civil war at all, but an aggression and invasion by an external power. But when men speaking the same language, living within the same cultural context, raised in the same cities and villages fight one another by the thousands that is civil war. When the men of the north (including Prime Minister Ky) are part of the government of the south, and vice versa, it is civil war. Even the Geneva Agreements called the two "zones" of the one country, not sovereign states.

North Vietnam has gone to the Chinese weapons system; their material help from China and Russia is considerable. But no Chinese officer or soldier has ever been found among the enemy's fighting cadres, to my knowledge.

It is the apparent conviction of Washington that if North Vietnam will just stop its infiltration into the south the war could be settled. Not necessarily, not unless Hanoi also ordered a cease fire all down the line. One of our leading generals there argues strongly that the units from the north need the local guerrillas far more than the guerrillas need them. The guerrillas are home; they need ammunition but not trucks or oil or great depots of rice.

How many men are coming down from the north? Last fall, Secretary McNamara said it was forty five hundred a month; this April we were told in Saigon that it had gone higher and might reach seven thousand. The other day the Pentagon again said forty five hundred. These figures are educated guesses, no more.

How many in all have come down? At the Saigon headquarters you are told there are, at a generous estimate, fifty battalions of North Vietnamese now in the south. Their battalions are far smaller than ours—perhaps four or five hundred men. That means about twenty five thousand northerns in their own combat units. That in turn, is only ten per cent of the estimated total of a quarter million organized (and semi-organized) enemy fighting men that we and the South Vietnamese now face.

On both sides, it's a much bigger war than a year ago, when it was nearly lost and when President Johnson ordered the massive infusions of American troops. Our intelligence officers out there now believe that the enemy is now better armed, man for man, than our South Vietnamese allies. Far worse armed, of course, than we.

Our fighting men, our weapons and devices, our tactical ingenuity—all are profoundly impressive. We could not fight this war at all were it not our side that enjoys the real "privileged sanctuaries"—the sea and the sky. Both are denied to the enemy. If our tactics are ingenious, our grand strategy remains a mystery, at least to me. We are fighting what is essentially a war of attrition, the most disagreeable kind of war, counting progress by the number of enemy bodies.

The count is accurate when our men can actually go among the bodies; when the Air Force claims so many Viet Cong killed from bombing and strafing runs, those are foolish guesses. The claims of enemy killed by the South Vietnamese forces—and the figures on their own casualties—may be approximately

right or wildly wrong; none of us can really check.

It might be better if we in the news business reported weekly progress in terms of hamlets restored or re-settled, classrooms built, village chiefs who feel it safe to go back and sleep in their own houses. This, after all, is what the war is about. And in this respect there is progress. It is something to see tough American Marines acting as dedicated social workers; it is a fact worth knowing that of the three thousand Marines who have voluntarily extended their term of duty in Vietnam, most are those men who work daily with the ordinary people. Progress, but painfully slow progress, and against it must be set the great numbers of refugees who come into our secured areas. About a million of them now. And not all, by any means, fleeing from Viet Cong terror; many fleeing from the terror of our napalm and high explosives which have, inescapably, killed and maimed hundreds of innocent people.

We are not really conquering territory. Our official statement is that at the end of last year eight and half per cent of the total land area was considered secure; at the end of February nine and half per cent; all the rest is in enemy hands or disputed and unsafe, or empty. About eight million people, a bit over half the population, are in secure allied controlled areas.

We are using giant sledgehammers to kill hornets. The Vietcong's National Liberation Front in the south has an annual budget estimated at about ten million dollars. Our annual costs in this war run to about fifteen billion. The enemy needs an estimated eighty seven tons of supplies each day; the American establishment alone needs about twenty-thousand tons a day. In terms of last year's total expenditure for the war, each enemy soldier killed last year cost us well over a million dollars.

What of our human investment and human losses? Of the total American military in-country, say 285,000 (or so) only a distinct minority do the real fighting, on the ground and in the air. They alone are the heroes. All the rest, in the enormous support and supply echelons, in the cities and ports, in the countless offices—they may occasionally court danger, but their life is wholly different, usually comfortable, for a great many enjoyable.

We had, when I left, five combat divisions and two brigades in the field, around eighty five thousand men. Add to that the special forces teams and the combat fliers. Of these I would guess, generously, that about sixty thousand can be defined as men in frequent combat. Now this is an arbitrary definition, but necessary—some definitions necessary—if we are to think at all about our human investment and losses.

And thinking, from that rough definition, one feels obliged to say that our casualties are high, not low. They are low in relation to the total number in Vietnam, mostly men who never or rarely ever see the enemy. And low compared to enemy losses. But our loses in combat dead and wounded have mounted rapidly to the current rate of about 30 thousand a year. One year is a man's term of service there. On the statistical face of it, then, the chances for the individual fighting soldier in an active combat zone avoiding death or wounds in his twelve months are not great, about fifty-fifty. What lengthens his odds is the increasing rotation of more units, not just between home and Vietnam, but between the fighting zones and the rest zones. If enemy attacks slacken, that, of course, will improve the odds.

For every man admitted to hospitals, in Vietnam for combat injuries, three times as many are admitted for non-combat injuries and disease. In terms of combat troops, one is forced to the conclusion that we lose the

13484

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

June 23, 1966

equivalent of about a battalion a week, most of them, of course, to return later on. But this is a rather constant process; the need for more men and more rotation in combat operations would seem obvious.

In this sense, our casualties are high, not low. And by the other relevant measuring rod—the lasting gain from the average combat operation—some Viet Cong killed, some rice destroyed, a village cleaned out, much of which the enemy will later replace and recover—by this measure, too, the casualties must be considered high, not low.

Last summer began the big increase in the American fighting force. So this summer, tens of thousands of men will leave Vietnam. But they will be replaced, these veterans, by green troops. However good their training at home, all soldiers are green until they have gone through at least one real battle. And green-ness does cost lives. One green company of my acquaintance recently lost a hundred and thirty men, killed and badly wounded, out of its hundred and seventy, in one engagement. In the official handout later, the casualties of that action were described as "moderate," presumably because other units were also involved or because the enemy lost even more. The phrase "heavy casualties" I don't think I ever saw in those handout statistics.

I do not believe we are losing this war or will lose it. I am not sure one can call it a stalemate, as some men do. The Viet Cong in the south and those units from the north are getting badly hurt. That is why the Viet Cong is now recruiting kids as young as thirteen from their homes in the south, taxing the people more heavily and thus losing some of their popular support. That is why some of those northern units are not at all well trained; that is why those who desert to the other side are nearly all the enemy fighters, not South Vietnamese or, of course, American.

Hanoi may have to call it off, though we see no signs yet that it will. We are not playing chess. Both sides are playing poker, doubling each lost bet. It is a test of political will.

But like some others, when I try to envisage the process of winning, I am haunted by a spectre. The spectre of this fragmented, weary, Vietnamese society.

It was our official belief and the argument among many of the so-called Hawks, that as we stopped losing this war—which we've done—and as we started winning it, which we're not quite done—the bitterly conflicting political and social factions inside South Vietnam would start to pull together, in their national interest. But the trouble is that Vietnam is only a society, not a nation. There is not a single leader of country-wide prestige in South Vietnam. The people have had little experience in responding to general laws and impersonal institutions. They respond to local personalities, cliques, religious groupings or their own private interest. The resistance and rioting of the most militant Buddhists seems to mean that they hate the central government more than they hate the Communist enemy.

We try to apply Western logic and experience to this Oriental land. So we encourage the elections, envisage a parliament, eventual civilian rule, representing groups and regions.

My own guess is that this process of democratizing would produce years of political turmoil before stability is reached. It will probably, though not certainly, open a whole new pandora's box, all the quarrels in the country bursting into the open. Vietnam, I think myself, is not to be compared with Korea or Greece, where we were successful, in these respects; a strong national sense and strong leaders existed in those countries.

If this proves to be the trend, as we try to democratize government in Vietnam, then

the immediate consequence will be a nightmare for us—for we should then have to involve ourselves deeper and deeper into their politics, their economy and more and more of the fighting and dying will be done by Americans and less and less by the Vietnamese.

Ten days ago, Secretary McNamara asserted that Vietnamese politics would not hinder our war effort there. It is part of the duty of national leaders to speak from their faith, not their fears. But it is part of the duty of the press to examine their faith, to raise the questions that officials never publicly raise.

The hypothetical alternatives in Vietnam remain about what they were: bomb more of North Vietnam's industry and see what happens while nervously watching nervous China; halt the bombing and pull back to our base areas and see what happens; encourage the various third nation efforts to get negotiations started; quit Vietnam entirely; keep the pressure on, as we are doing, and wait for Hanoi's will to break.

As of now, the prospect is more pressure—more and heavier war; that is the meaning of the stepped-up draft, the new troop shipments, the longer lanes of cargo vessels plowing the South China Sea, the increasing roar of the airplanes settling on to those ever increasing airfields.

I should like to mention, before I end this long and not very happy discourse, two matters: a bit cosmic perhaps, but of fundamental consequence for our future affairs.

One is the fantastic size of our military establishment and the fantastic speed by which its cost increases. This can consume our marginal substance. This is what General Eisenhower warned about in his last words as President. He said we must guard against undue power by a military industrial complex. It will take a very convincing peace and a very strong President to put our military genie back in the bottle.

The other thing is this: the deepest, strongest forces motivating the people of Asia are not those we picture as we sit here at home. From here, one has the illusion that Asia is clanking armies, colliding ideologies, aggression and fear, that Asia is

political. Asians have discovered the great secret, so long hidden from their hope: that man is not born to a short life of pain and work and poverty. They see the marvelous evidence, nearly everywhere they look; Japan, a booming economic colossus whose production may soon pass Great Britain's. Korea, prosperous enough to do without direct American aid. Taiwan, where food production has doubled in fifteen years and where new hotels, highways, factories open every month. Thailand, whose cities boom and grow. Indonesia, which has stopped its ridiculous war with Malaysia and now wants to join the real procession. Even Communist China, where basic comfort now seems assured for most, and where a new generation of economists, engineers, builders is slowly but surely coming to replace the old men of politics and war as they were replaced in Russia when Stalin died.

In Taiwan I had a Chinese driver, name of Jimmy. A mainlander who had to flee the Chinese Communists and has no love for them at all. But he said to me, "If only America and China can learn to get along—what a wonderful thing for us all."

Jimmy perceives what Asia and life can be. Our government perceives it, as attested by the Johnson plans for Southeast Asia's economic development.

But if this war in Vietnam goes wrong and the great collision does come, all this will be lost. And that would break history's heart.

This reporter, like most, even among those

who fear and doubt, still believes that God and the stars will again indulge their notorious weakness for Americans and bring us through this unhappy Vietnamese transaction in safety and peace.

There, like the government officials, I speak from faith, not from the facts; knowing, as they know, that faith—even blind faith—can sometimes change the facts.

This is Eric Sevareid in New York. Good evening.

ADDRESS BY AMBASSADOR
CHARLES LUCET AND INTERVIEW
OF MINISTER OF FOREIGN AF-
FAIRS COUVE DE MURVILLE, OF
FRANCE

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, on June 15, His Excellency Charles Lucet, French Ambassador to the United States, made a most interesting address at a luncheon of the National Press Club. The Ambassador's remarks clarify the policies of his Government and of President de Gaulle.

On June 5, M. Couve de Murville, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, was interviewed by the Canadian Broadcasting Corp. His comments also serve to clarify the policies of the French Government.

Mr. President, the Ambassador's address and the Minister's interview deserve the attention of the Senate, and I ask unanimous consent that they be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the address and interview were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ADDRESS BY HIS EXCELLENCY CHARLES LUCET
FRENCH AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES
BEFORE THE NATIONAL PRESS CLUB LUNCHEON
ON WEDNESDAY, JUNE 15, 1966

I want to thank you for your welcome and tell you how much it pleases me. This is not the first time, of course, that I have attended a National Press Club Luncheon—even among the honored guests—but it is the first time that I have had the privilege of being your speaker, and that is quite another thing.

A preliminary remark is needed: I have lived in this city and country which I love for thirteen years, and I have spent here the best years of my life. Here I have learned the English language a little, but its pronunciation, not at all. I had hoped to overcome this disability, but it really seems to be "beyond repair." Perhaps you have noticed that my accent is a little like that of Charles Boyer, even if I have passed the age of "bedroom eyes."

The more I think about it, the more delighted I am to have an opportunity to express my views. After all, we have more or less the same duties and, to a certain extent, the same job. You inform your readers of what goes on in a world which you observe with cold, impartial, photographic eyes. I, as unbiased as you, do the same, with one difference—I have fewer readers.

Having returned to the United States after an absence of six years, I naturally see a lot of changes. Those of you who have recently been in my country, perhaps after a long absence, may also have seen a striking transformation in France, and this is what I would like to say a few words about first.

We have lived through two wars, and, in addition, between 1945 and 1962, the ordeals of two colonial wars in Indochina and Algeria. We are now living in peace for the first time in many years of our history—since 1962, to be exact.

13432

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

June 23, 1966

"(7) provide such fiscal control and fund accounting procedures as may be necessary to assure proper disbursement of and accounting of funds received under this section.

"(c) The Secretary shall approve any State plan and any modification thereof which complies with the provisions of subsection (b)."

On page 17, between lines 11 and 12, insert the following new section:

"Sec. 105. For the purpose of carrying out section 404 of title 23, United States Code, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated the sum of \$5,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1968, \$7,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1969 and for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1970, \$8,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1971, and \$9,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1972."

On page 17, line 12, strike out "Sec. 105" and substitute "Sec. 106", and redesignate the succeeding sections accordingly.

ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS OF BILL

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, at its next printing, I ask unanimous consent that my name and the names of Senators BOGGS, FONG, GRIFFIN, GRUENING, INOUYE, METCALF, MONTOYA, MURPHY, PEARSON, and YOUNG of Ohio be added as cosponsors of the bill (S. 3112) to amend the Clean Air Act so as to authorize grants to air pollution control agencies for maintenance of air pollution control programs in addition to present authority for grants to develop, establish, or improve such programs; make the use of appropriations under the act more flexible by consolidating the appropriation authorizations under the act and deleting the provision limiting the total of grants for support of air pollution control programs to 20 percent of the total appropriation for any year; extend the duration of the programs authorized by the act; and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS OF BILLS

Under authority of the orders of the Senate, as indicated below, the following names have been added as additional cosponsors for the following bills:

Authority of June 7, 1966:

S. 3475. A bill to abolish the office of United States commissioner, to establish in place thereof within the judicial branch of the Government the offices of United States magistrate and deputy United States magistrate, and for other purposes: Mr. BAYH, Mr. BENNETT, Mr. BREWSTER, Mr. DOUGLAS, Mr. ERVIN, Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts, Mr. LONG of Missouri, and Mr. MOSS.

Authority of June 8, 1966:

S. 3482. A bill to enlarge the home mortgage purchase authority which the Federal National Mortgage Association may exercise in its secondary market operations by increasing the amount of preferred stock which such Association may issue for delivery to the Secretary of the Treasury: Mr. BENNETT, and Mr. COOPER.

NOTICE CONCERNING NOMINATION BEFORE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

Mr. EASTLAND. Mr. President, the following nomination has been referred

to and is now pending before the Committee on the Judiciary:

Ben Hardeman, of Alabama, to be U.S. attorney, middle district of Alabama, term of 4 years—reappointment.

On behalf of the Committee on the Judiciary, notice is hereby given to all persons interested in this nomination to file with the committee, in writing, on or before Thursday, June 30, 1966, any representations or objections they may wish to present concerning the above nomination, with a further statement whether it is their intention to appear at any hearing which may be scheduled.

ADDRESSES, EDITORIALS, ARTICLES, ETC., PRINTED IN THE APPENDIX

On request, and by unanimous consent, addresses, editorials, articles, etc., were ordered to be printed in the Appendix, as follows:

By Mr. BYRD of West Virginia:

Speech by Birny Mason, Jr., chairman of the board, Union Carbide Corp., entitled "Industrial Development of West Virginia," delivered before the Governor's Conference on Industrial Development in West Virginia, on June 2, 1966, at Morgantown, W. Va.

THE MILITARY JUNTA IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, in Parade, which is the Sunday magazine section of the Washington Post and many other newspapers of our Nation, there was a very important and very interesting item in the June 19, 1966, issue, an item startling in character. In an article the question was asked:

The 10 generals who govern Vietnam with Nguyen Cao Ky at the head—can you tell me how many of them fought the French?

The answer given was:

Of the 10 generals in the junta, only one joined the Viet Minh resistance movement against the French in 1945. He is Lt. Gen. Phan Xuan Chieu, popularly recognized in Saigon as the only junta member who fought to free his country from French colonial rule. The other nine either fought on the side of the French or took training in French military schools during the Vietnamese war against the French from 1945 to 1954.

General Ky, the present Prime Minister, spent most of those years out of his country, learning to fly in French Air Force schools. In Vietnam, the Vietnamese forces fought the Japanese until the end of World War II. Then, the French colonial oppressors, who had governed Indochina for many years reinstated themselves in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, and sought to continue their oppressive colonial rule. The Vietnamese, from 1945 to 1954 waged a war of liberation against the French.

It is startling to Americans to learn that of the 10 generals we are now supporting in Saigon, 9 of them fought alongside the French colonial power at that time against the liberation of Vietnam.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 3 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. In other words, we Americans, who like to regard ourselves as the most revolutionary nation in the world, have become, it seems, the most unrevolutionary in nature. The generals with whom we are associated and are supporting and keeping in power in Saigon were the Tories of that day, and we are aiding and abetting them at this time. That fact is further evidenced that there is a civil war raging in Vietnam, and the National Liberation Front, which led the fight for freedom from 1946 on, is still fighting for the freedom of Vietnam as they see it.

This is further evidence that we are involved in a miserable civil war in Vietnam, which has little or no strategic or economic importance to the defense of the United States.

In 1954 12,000 of the French forces surrendered to the Viet Minh at Dienbienphu on May 7. Then, following that, in September the French withdrew their 240,000 men from Vietnam. The battle at Dienbienphu did not do it; they had been bled white over a period of 8 years. We are not being bled white, but we are spending from \$1 to \$2 billion each month intervening in that war in Vietnam, and the prospect of victory does not seem any brighter than when we committed ourselves to this messy civil war 10,000 miles from our shores.

The Vietminh who waged guerrilla warfare for the liberation of Vietnam and what is now Cambodia and Laos from 1946 to September 1954 came from all areas of Vietnam. Historically, there is no North nor South Vietnam. The demarcation line at the 17th parallel effected by the Geneva Accords was supposed to be temporary pending elections to be held in 1956 throughout all Vietnam. These were called off by our puppet head of state in Saigon, Diem, with the approval of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.

In the 8 years of struggle for freedom waged against the French colonial oppressors thousands of Vietnamese fought alongside the French against many thousand Vietnamese fighters who were then called Vietminh. Those who allied themselves with the French were the tories of that time. In recent years the Vietminh have been termed the Vietcong. Many of them now as then are members of the National Liberation Front. Those who had fought alongside the French moved south of the 17th parallel settling in what is called South Vietnam. Thousands of those from the southern area of Vietnam who had fought with the Vietminh against the French likewise settled in the north.

Prime Minister Ky has announced elections in South Vietnam for early this fall. These elections are for the purpose of electing an assembly to draft a constitution. It is noteworthy that in more than a year since Ky was selected by the generals as Prime Minister he never spoke out nor took any step toward elections until the conference with our President at Honolulu earlier this year. It is said he proposes that no Vietcong, or suspected Vietcong sympathizers and also

June 23, 1966

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

13431

where possible and appropriate substitute land will be provided for the park or site.

This amendment is consistent with the philosophy of the Federal-aid highway program, which is a program of close Federal-State cooperation. The amendment is patterned after section 134, title 23, United States Code, which was added to the Federal Highway Act in 1962 and which requires transportation planning in urban areas of over 50,000 population.

Adding this amendment to the law will work a hardship on no one and will benefit every man, woman, and child in this country. On behalf of all who value America's parklands, I ask for its acceptance.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of the amendment be printed at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be received, printed, and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the amendment will be printed in the RECORD.

The amendment (No. 616) was referred to the Committee on Public Works, as follows:

At the end of the bill insert a new section as follows:

"PRESERVATION OF PARKLANDS"

"Sec. 8. (a) Chapter 1 of title 23 of the United States Code is amended by inserting at the end thereof a new section as follows:

"P 137. Preservation of Parklands

"It is hereby declared to be the national policy that in carrying out the provisions of this title maximum effort should be made to preserve Federal, State, and local government parklands and historic sites and the beauty and historic value of such lands and sites. The Secretary shall cooperate with the States in developing highway plans and programs which carry out such policy. After July 1, 1968, the Secretary shall not approve under section 105 of this title any program for a project which requires the use for such project of any land from a Federal, State, or local government park or historic site unless (1) there is no feasible alternative to the use of such land, (2) such program includes all possible planning to minimize any harm to such park or site resulting from such use; and (3) where possible and appropriate substitute land will be provided for such park or site. Any additional project costs incurred for the purpose of acquiring any such substitute lands shall be considered to be included in "costs of rights-of-way" for the purpose of this title."

"(b) The analysis of such chapter is amended by adding at the end thereof the following:

"137. Preservation of Parklands."**HIGHWAY SAFETY ACT OF 1966—AMENDMENTS****AMENDMENTS NOS. 617 THROUGH 619**

MR. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I submit three amendments, intended to be proposed by me, to S. 3052, the so-called "Highway Safety Act of 1966." I stated on June 9, 1966, that a stronger Federal role in traffic safety is required than that provided in the bill reported by the Public Works Committee. Accordingly, my first amendment will restore the authorizations for sections 402 and 403 to the amounts and duration originally proposed in the bill. My second amendment authorizes \$400 million

in aid to the States for driver education and training. The third amendment provides \$36 million to assist the States in establishing and improving motor vehicle inspection facilities. I ask unanimous consent that the amendments be printed at this point in the RECORD. I plan to offer these amendments when the bill is before the Senate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendments will be received, printed, and will lie on the table; and, without objection, the amendments will be printed in the RECORD.

AMENDMENT No. 617

On page 17, line 1, strike out "and".

On page 17, line 2, immediately before the period, insert a semicolon and the following: "\$80,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1970; \$80,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1971; and \$100,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1972".

On page 17, line 7, strike out "and".

On page 17, line 8, immediately before the period, insert a semicolon and the following: "\$30,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1970; \$35,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1971; \$40,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1972".

AMENDMENT No. 618

On page 8, after line 16, insert after "403. Highway safety research and development" the following: "404. Grants for State motor vehicle inspection programs."

On page 12, between lines 5 and 6, insert the following new section:

"§ 404. Grants for State driver education and training programs

"(a) From sums appropriated pursuant to the Highway Safety Act of 1966 to carry out the provisions of this section for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1968, and for the four succeeding fiscal years, the Secretary is authorized to make grants to States to pay up to 50 per centum of the cost of developing, establishing, and improving programs for driver education in accordance with the provisions of this section. The Secretary shall determine the amount of the Federal share of the cost of such programs for each fiscal year based upon the funds appropriated therefor for that fiscal year and the number of participating States.

"(b) Any State desiring to participate in the grant program under this section shall submit through its State educational agency, a State plan which shall—

"(1) provide for the initiation of a State program for driver education or for a significant expansion and improvement of such a program already in existence;

"(2) include provisions for the training of qualified instructors and their certification;

"(3) provide for adequate research, development, and procurement of practice driving facilities, simulators, and other similar teaching aids;

"(4) include provision for financial assistance by the State to institutions of higher education for research in driver education testing, curriculum, and methods of instruction;

"(5) provide that the State will pay from non-Federal sources the cost of such program in excess of amounts received under this section;

"(6) provide adequate State supervision and administration of such driver education;

"(7) provide that the State agency will make such reports, in such form and containing such information as the Secretary may require; and

"(8) provide such fiscal control and fund accounting procedures as may be necessary to assure proper disbursement of and ac-

counting of funds received under this section.

"(c) Prior to prescribing regulations under this section the Secretary shall consult with the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare.

"(d) The Secretary shall approve any State plan and any modification thereof which complies with the provisions of subsection (b).

"(e) For the purpose of this section, the term 'State educational agency' means the State board of education or other agency or officer primarily responsible for the State supervision of public elementary and secondary schools, or, if there is no such officer or agency, an officer or agency designated by the governor or by State law."

On page 17, between lines 11 and 12, insert the following new sections:

"Sec. 105. For the purpose of carrying out section 404 of title 23, United States Code, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated the sum of \$60,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1968, \$70,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1969, and \$90,000,000 for each of the three succeeding fiscal years."

On page 17, line 12, strike out "Sec. 105" and substitute "Sec. 106", and redesignate the succeeding sections accordingly.

AMENDMENT No. 619

On page 8, after line 16, insert after "403. Highway safety research and development" the following:

"404. Grants for State motor vehicle inspection programs."

On page 12, between lines 5 and 6, insert the following new section:

"§ 404. Grants for State motor vehicle inspection programs

"(a) From sums appropriated pursuant to the Highway Safety Act of 1966 to carry out the provisions of this section for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1968, and for the four succeeding fiscal years, the Secretary is authorized to make grants to States to pay up to 20 per centum of the cost for the establishment or improvement of State programs for motor vehicle inspection in accordance with the provisions of this section. The Secretary shall determine the amount of the Federal share of the cost of such programs for each fiscal year based upon the funds appropriated therefor for that fiscal year and the number of participating States.

"(b) Any State desiring to participate in the grant program under this section shall designate or create an appropriate State agency for the purpose of this section, and submit, through such State agency, a State plan which shall—

"(1) set forth a program for establishing, or improving (in the case of a State which already has in operation a State administered motor vehicle inspection program), State supervised motor vehicle inspection at garages or other suitable facilities certified by the State for that purpose;

"(2) agree to accept and apply such minimum standards for highway traffic safety with respect to inspection as the Secretary shall by regulation prescribe;

"(3) provide that the State will pay from non-Federal sources the cost of such program in excess of amounts received under this section;

"(4) set forth provisions for the financing of such plan without Federal assistance beginning with the fiscal year ending June 30, 1973;

"(5) contain satisfactory evidence that the State agency will adequately supervise such program;

"(6) provide that the State agency will make such reports, in such form and containing such information as the Secretary may require; and

June 23, 1966

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

13433

no member of the National Liberation Front, whether or not he is suspected of being a Communist, and no neutralist, will be permitted to vote. It is wishful thinking that such an election would result in pacification of South Vietnam.

France having squandered tremendous sums of money in addition to the billions of dollars in military aid from the United States finally withdrew. We now have nearly 360,000 men of our Armed Forces in South Vietnam. In addition, 40,000 in Thailand, and 50,000 officers and men of our 7th Fleet off the Vietnam coast. Our servicemen in southeast Asia are the "cream of the crop." They are the finest fighting men in the world. Their morale is high. Their firepower is so tremendous many more Vietcong have been killed than Americans; and we have suffered more than 2,000 who have died in combat this year.

What assurance can there be if by late December our forces have been increased to 600,000 or 800,000, as seems probable, that guerrilla tactics of the Vietcong will have been ended and Vietcong resistance crushed? Even if the Hanoi government is silent as to offers to negotiate and during the coming years the Vietcong do bury their weapons, return to their farms or go to Saigon, Cam Ranh Bay and elsewhere in South Vietnam to work for the Americans and even if the shooting and the killing should cease, is there anyone who can say following the time we "bring the boys home" that guerrilla warfare will not again break out?

What is occurring in Vietnam seems to be a rerun of the 8-year struggle on the part of French generals against the Vietnamese seeking freedom from French oppression. Also it is most unfortunate for us that heads of State of Japan, the Philippine Republic and other Asian allies and of allies like Canada have refused to give us any military aid whatever.

WHY NOT HELP AND NOT DISCRIMINATE AGAINST THE ST. LAWRENCE SEAWAY?

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, earlier this month I spoke out in this Chamber strongly opposing recent attempts to increase tolls on the St. Lawrence Seaway. At that time I stated that should tolls on the seaway be increased, I intend to ask that the Senate Committee on Public Works review Federal expenditures for future improvements of entrance channels leading from the oceans to our ports with the view toward placing all entrance channels on the same self-liquidating basis as the St. Lawrence Seaway.

What is good for the goose is good for the gander. All of this Nation's seaports, including the Great Lakes ports, should be placed on the same economic footing with equal rights of access to the oceans of the world. It is high time that officials of port authorities in Eastern and in Gulf States and executives of railroads serving those cities recognize the fact that ports and great cities on the Great Lakes such as Cleveland, Toledo, Lorain, Duluth, Buffalo, Milwaukee, Chicago, and others have become interna-

tional seaports in every sense of the word and are no longer to be considered as poor country cousins from the Midwest.

Millions of our Nation's taxpayers' dollars have been spent for construction of entrance channels for ports such as New Orleans, Philadelphia, Houston, and other cities and on none of these waterways do shippers pay a penny in toll charges. At the same time, one ship traveling from Montreal, Canada, to Cleveland, Ohio, loaded with 15,000 tons of cargo now pays seaway tolls and transit charges amounting to more than \$14,000.

Mr. President, at the present time the great St. Lawrence Seaway is a self-liquidating project on which 3½ percent interest is being paid on every dollar borrowed by our Government to construct it. Both principal and interest must be returned from toll revenue derived from all toll shipping within a 50-year period. What is important today is to encourage, not to discourage, use of the great St. Lawrence Seaway. In doing so, we shall not only take advantage of the great potential which the seaway holds for Ohio and for all the States in the Midwest, but in the long run through greater use of the St. Lawrence Seaway we shall enable it to liquidate its debt with greater dispatch and probably in many fewer years than the 50 years now contemplated. Increasing toll rates at this time would only work to destroy the effectiveness of the seaway.

Mr. President, on June 16, 1966, there appeared an excellent editorial, entitled "Why Not?" in the Toledo Blade, one of the great newspapers of our Nation, commenting on this subject. I commend this to my colleagues and ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD at this time as part of my remarks.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Toledo Blade, June 16, 1966]

WHY NOT?

"All of this nation's seaports, including the Great Lakes ports, should be placed on the same economic footing with equal rights of access to the oceans of the world."—Senator STEPHEN YOUNG.

It remained for Ohio's Senator YOUNG to inject a bit of irrefutable logic into the debate over whether tolls on the St. Lawrence Seaway ought to be maintained at present levels, raised, or reduced. It boils down to a question of just why this one waterway connecting U.S. ports with ports abroad should be saddled with discriminatory tolls when other U.S. waterways on which tax funds are spent are toll-free.

Senator YOUNG indicated that he intends to introduce legislation to impose tolls on vessels using coastal ports if the drive, led by Seaway opponents, to increase tolls on that waterway succeeds. There is fully as much justification for that as there is for requiring vessels moving to and from the Great Lakes via the Seaway to pay tolls that run into thousands of dollars per passage.

U.S. taxpayers, for instance, have had to pick up the \$100 million bill—nearly as much as the entire U.S. investment in the Seaway—for construction of a ship channel serving New Orleans, but not a cent of toll is charged there. Another \$70 million in tax funds went into the Delaware River channel, \$57 million into a channel linking Houston with the Gulf of Mexico, and \$50 million to connect Sacramento with salt water, to mention but a few

cases. Yet, on none of those waterways do shippers pay a penny in toll charges.

Why, then, should a 15,000-ton vessel using the Seaway be forced to fork over \$14,000 in tolls, when the same ship could use any other U.S. waterway free?

That is a point which Senator YOUNG should keep raising, as he pierces the smoke-screen of propaganda thrown up by lobbyists for the eastern ports, the railroads, and others who have little interest in seeing the Seaway succeed. The Seaway should expect no special favors from our Government or from anyone else; on the other hand, it should not be hit by a toll schedule that no other tax-built and publicly supported waterway must carry.

If those forces trying to reduce the Seaway's competitive thrust by imposing higher tolls will not listen to reason, then perhaps they will get the Senator's message when, as the second ranking member of the Senate Public Works Committee, he dusts off legislation to meet fire with fire.

HOME RULE FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, the lead editorial in today's Washington Post, entitled "The Road to the Polls," points out very well the difficulties besetting efforts to obtain home rule for the District of Columbia.

A reading of this editorial should persuade anyone that is a cynical partisan political power play behind some of these efforts, seeking to lock in political power at the expense of what is needed and good for the people of the District.

Specifically, these power interests wish to have elections at large on a partisan ticket; and they are content to pursue these goals even if it means the loss of a home-rule bill for the District.

I recall, at the time the Senate passed a bill last year, the partisan power that was used to defeat amendments to make these elections nonpartisan and to require members of the city council to be elected from separate wards rather than some or all of them at large.

Those who genuinely wish to see home rule for the District would do well to dissociate themselves from the partisan political power players, who must bear the full responsibility for the failure of the Congress to promptly enact a good home-rule bill for the District.

I ask unanimous consent that the editorial be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, June 23, 1966]

THE ROAD TO THE POLLS

The hope for city elections in Washington this year is being demolished by the very people who want them most. There are now four bills to extend the city's voting rights, and each is being vociferously attacked by the partisans of the others. As the city's political leaders go after each other, the genuine enemies of local democracy can look on with their hands in their pockets and smiles on their faces.

If none of these bills is passed in this Congress, the city will not be able to blame that misfortune on the wicked segregationists and the Board of Trade. The responsibility will lie a great deal closer to home. The District's Democratic Central Committee is particularly culpable. Instead of using its authority to weld together a broad alliance of

13434

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

June 23, 1966

all who favor elected self-government in Washington, the Committee is indulging itself in the luxury of old vendettas and following narrow factional interests.

The future distribution of political power in the city depends heavily upon the character of the election process. Election at large, citywide, gives an advantage to politicians with access to large citywide organizations. Partisan elections give power to party managers. Nonpartisan elections help independent candidates, and elections by ward are essential to those who, like most slum politicians, have a personal following concentrated in one neighborhood.

The Administration's home rule bill, passed by the Senate but not the House, would establish partisan elections and, for most of the important offices, citywide elections at large. It would greatly benefit the proprietors of the only citywide political organization in town, the Democratic Central Committee. Small wonder that the Committee is ready to defend this version to the bitter end.

The Sisk city charter bill, passed by the House but not the Senate, would establish an elected charter committee to decide the form of the future city government. Since the elections to the crucial charter committee would be nonpartisan but at large citywide, the Sisk bill is widely supported among the Democratic faction that was beaten in the last primary.

The Green amendment, still in the House Education and Labor Committee, would establish a School Board elected by ward on a nonpartisan ballot. This kind of election would directly help the rising generation of young leaders in the central city, who have been working through social action organizations and have no hope of favor from the parties.

The fourth bill, to provide a nonvoting District delegate in the House, carries little power and causes little stir. All of these bills are honest and useful proposals. The most promising, at this particular moment, is the bill for an elected School Board. While the Administration home rule bill promises much more, it cannot be moved without massive intervention by the White House.

But none of the bills can be passed without some measure of agreement among the city's political and civic leadership. It is still possible for the city to go to the polls within the next year, but only if factional leaders show themselves capable of tactical skills not currently visible.

TAXATION AND INFLATION

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, a timely and outstanding article, entitled "Taxation Alone Cannot Cope With Inflation," written by Harley L. Lutz, was published in the Wall Street Journal of Tuesday, June 21, 1966. Dr. Lutz is professor emeritus of public finance at Princeton University.

Dr. Lutz persuasively points out that an excessive increase in the money supply is the direct cause of inflation; that taxation has no effect on the money supply; that budget balancing can be achieved by reduced Federal spending; and that this would be the better way to control the money supply in view of the drag effects of taxation.

I ask unanimous consent that this article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Wall Street Journal, June 21, 1966]
TAXATION ALONE CAN'T COPE WITH INFLATION
(By Harley L. Lutz)

The critical phase of the New Economics doctrine of perpetual prosperity through Government manipulation of the economy is approaching. The first stage—stimulation through deficits, cheap money, tax cuts, and guidelines for wage increases—is drawing to an end. Despite positive evidence of an undecrease of inflation, its existence, when not denied or ignored, was rationalized on the ground that expanding total demand was the chief prop of prosperity. This was a comforting doctrine for both Government and business as long as inflation worked underground. When it erupted into the price indexes the facts could no longer be disregarded. Inflation is now recognized to be a present danger. The moment of truth is at hand.

Inflation has two aspects. One is the visible evidence of rising prices, the other an excessive increase of the money supply, excessive in relation to the supply needed to effect the exchange of produced goods and services at a given price level. As used here money supply means demand deposits in commercial banks and currency in circulation. Rising prices are more generally perceived and understood than details of bank statements and Treasury reports. They are not, however, the real thing but rather a symptom or outward expression of the basic inflationary force.

TWO CATEGORIES AND POLICIES

The policies designed to cope with inflation fall into two categories, according to whether the attack is directed at the symptom of rising prices or at the root cause. The difference between superficial and fundamental inflation control measures is apparent in the following summary:

Policies aimed at inflation through price control:

1. Price control by a Government agency, as in World War II.

2. Real or simulated outrage at price increases proposed by business concerns and severe pressure for rescission. No similar indignation at or condemnation of wage increases exceeding the guidelines.

3. Dumping of Government stockpiles to prevent price increases.

4. A campaign for consumer boycott of goods deemed to be priced too high.

5. Pressure on business concerns to curtail or defer programs for new capital investment. Hints at repeal of the 7% investment credit.

6. Tax increase in the mistaken belief that it would cause prices to fall by reducing total demand.

Policies aimed at curbing inflation by limiting or reducing money supply.

1. Restriction of the capacity of commercial banks to increase demand deposits through loans and investments.

2. Federal budget balance.

The political approach to the problem deals primarily with the superficial aspect of inflation—rising prices—and only as a last resort, if at all, with the basic cause. This is natural for more popular support can be garnered by attacks on profiteering and price "chiseling" than by essays on the technicalities of monetary and fiscal policy. An illustration is the bad semantic connotation of budget balance. Moreover, a switch now to emphasis on fundamentals would mean an admission that the Government policies responsible for inflation had been wrong. Any hint of fallibility is bad for the political image.

Since inflation is a blowing up, or inflating of the money supply, effective control involves action to halt the expansion. This

requires a combination of monetary and fiscal policy. The details of monetary policy must be dealt with here only briefly for the main emphasis is to be on the role of taxation in an inflation control program. Specifically, it is a question of the extent to which taxation, as an instrument of policy, can check inflation by influencing the money supply.

SOURCE OF NEW MONEY

The main source of increased money supply is the expansion of loans and investments by commercial banks through the procedure of entering the proceeds of these transactions as demand deposit credits. Currency in circulation has also increased but its chief function is to serve as pocket and till money and for some payrolls. Any issue above these needs will not stay in circulation but will drift into the banks. For the greater part of total purchases and other payments is effected by means of checks and other documents drawn on deposit accounts.

Restriction of bank credit expansion is applied through appropriate monetary action, including sales of securities by the Federal Open Market Committee to soak up member bank reserves and a higher discount rate when these banks borrow from their respective Reserve Banks to replenish reserves. The discount rate was advanced to 4.5% last winter amid grumblings from "diehard" cheap money advocates. In a single week of mid-April, 1966, the Committee sold \$1,084 million of Government securities to tighten the brakes on credit expansion. Further restrictive action may be in the offing.

The expansion of demand deposits occurs in response to both private and public demand for more credit accommodation. Just why the process of bank lending and investing should, in the course of a boom, lead to creation of an excessive money supply is explicable only in terms of human attitudes and behavior. It can best be explained briefly by saying that in a boom expectations eventually outrun realizations. Speculative anticipation of the future becomes extravagant. Hence loans are made at greater risk. Investments are screened less cautiously. Assurance of Government economists that the economic cycle has been abolished contributes to expansionary enthusiasm by removing the fear of a deflationary downturn. In recent years the Government's own example and influence have been on the side of cheap money, easy credit, and disregard of prudence in spending. For these and other reasons, over-optimistic credit policy increases the money supply at a greater rate than justified by long-term reality. Inflation control requires that the increase be slowed down to a rate consistent with maintenance of a stable price level.

Both the private and the public sectors of the economy have contributed to excessive expansion of credit and adequate control measures must be appropriate to these respective transactions. In this regard a significant difference emerges. Private credit can be controlled and regulated by monetary policy, provided the Federal Reserve System is not prevented from exercising the necessary restraint by political pressure and interference. There is no authority superior to the Federal Government to regulate the amount and the terms of its borrowing. Its fiscal and monetary discipline must be self-imposed.

Thus we have a definite boundary to our topic. Established agencies can effectively control private credit excesses, though there will always be criticism of Federal Reserve operations as being sometimes too much, too little, too soon, or too late. From this point on the concern will be with the measures

June 23, 1966

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

13409

league has laid down, there is, I believe, a duty incumbent upon the executive branch of the Government to respond to this challenge posed by the Senator from Michigan. It should indicate to the Senator and to the Senate how it intends to improve the procedures and how it intends to remove the apparently tremendous opportunity for corruption that exists in the use of the commodity import program.

I would also like to state to my able friend from Michigan that I thoroughly applaud his excellent and constructive suggestion that businessmen in America devote their knowledge and experience to the business of the Government of the United States for a temporary period of time. In this manner, they can bring their unique and successful qualifications under the free enterprise system to bear in the exceedingly important cause of freemen 10,000 miles from this Chamber.

There is also a great deal of pride for all Americans, to be found in what our young men in the U.S. Marine Corps did with respect to the civilian population of South Vietnam. The Senator from Michigan has ably drawn our attention to the outstanding efforts of our fighting men in the small hamlets and villages in the rural part of that tragic and melancholy land. I was particularly proud to know that our men in uniform have assisted young people in constructing schools and the local, indigenous population in improving agriculture.

Now I should like to ask the Senator a question. In the Senator's opinion, is our civilian aid program working with the civilian aims of our military personnel in that country?

Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, first, I thank my distinguished colleague from California for his very kind observations.

I think, generally speaking, that there is close cooperation and liaison between our AID agency in Vietnam and our military. I elaborate on my statement by emphasizing that my criticism is not focused, or is not intended to be focused, on all aspects of our AID program in Vietnam. I am particularly pointing out the commodity import program.

I also want to emphasize that we have many fine, competent, dedicated people in Vietnam in the AID agency. They are not all incompetent, by any means. Particularly in the pacification program, for example, we have people in the AID agency who are out in the countryside, incurring considerable personal risk, and who are doing a very fine job in some of the same areas in which the marines are doing it. When I mentioned the marines, I do not wish to imply that that is the only part of the military that is doing this work with the people there. It just happens that I had an opportunity to be in the field with the marines.

I hope, with that elaboration, perhaps the address I have made today will be placed in a proper perspective.

Mr. KUCHEL. The Senator has indeed done just that. What prompted my interest was an opportunity I had to speak with some returning military and civilian personnel over the last year. Our conversations reflected the views of

the able Senator in that we do have excellent and able American civilians in that area. Some of them raised considerable question, in connection with our Appropriations Committee function, that perhaps there was not sufficient attention given to the problems of the civilian population. As the Senator has said, 80 percent of the people in Vietnam live in rural areas. It is in these small villages and hamlets, where such problems as inadequate sanitation and antiquated techniques of agriculture and the like, offer a tremendous opportunity for this fine program to help the civilian population and the cause for freedom.

I would like to thank the Senator for his admirable presentation and for his lucid response to my question. I would again like to welcome the Senator from Michigan to the Senate and to thank him for his able and constructive speech.

Mr. GRIFFIN. I thank the Senator.

I also wish to express appreciation to the majority leader for making it possible for me to make this speech at this time.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I am glad we had the opportunity to have the Senator make his speech.

Mr. PEARSON. Mr. President, let me say that I regret that committee assignment responsibility prevented me from being on the floor when the distinguished Senator from Michigan [Mr. GRIFFIN] addressed the Chamber. His experience in that troubled area, his great record in Congress, have enabled him to give to our own colleagues, and indeed to the Nation, a great insight into the problems to which he has directed attention.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Kansas [Mr. PEARSON] be allowed to speak for 5 minutes, and I also ask unanimous consent that thereafter the Senator from Alaska [Mr. BARTLETT] may be allowed to speak for 30 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.

VIETNAM CREDIBILITY GAP

Mr. PEARSON. Mr. President, on May 29 Radio Moscow devoted some attention to the speech I made on this floor on May 27 wherein the Soviets indicated that yet another U.S. Senator had criticized the President for his Vietnam policy.

I would not expect to be correctly reported or correctly interpreted by Radio Moscow, but I shall not let their misrepresentation go without response.

Mr. President, I support a policy aimed at the containment of communism in southeast Asia; the halting of Communist aggression and the guarantee of an independent and a peaceful South Vietnam.

But, Mr. President, what I sought to interpret on May 27 is some meaning as to why the American people are concerned and confused about our commitment and about our participation in Vietnam. For the truth of the matter is that our Nation is at war. Our objec-

tives are honorable and worthy. The American people genuinely want to support the President in any international crisis.

Yet to the average citizen whose support is so vital in our democratic system we appear to be helpless victims of a situation we cannot control; that the most powerful Nation in the world cannot determine its own destiny; and that while we know where we have been, it is impossible to guess where we will be in the future.

Why is there such uncertainty and confusion? Why do the polls and the surveys indicate a lack of support for the President who acts as the Commander in Chief of a nation which has always responded with great unity in times of international confrontations?

The inevitable answer was that the administration's position was not believable. There was a lack of credibility. And in the Washington lexicon of the day there existed a "credibility gap."

With some due candor I would assume that this is a result of partisan politics in an election year. Yet the most vociferous critics are members of the President's party. And one cannot overlook the fact that there continue to be a growing number of newspaper editors and columnists who are constrained to question our policy.

So, while the ever-present partisan politics is always present, this lack of belief in the administration's policy must be caused by something else. And that something else is a mismatch between words and deeds, a contradiction between ends and means and a conflict in statements and actions which have existed over a long period of time and which in turn brings about that slow erosion of public confidence.

Therefore, the tragedy of the most agonizing episode in the mid-sixties for all Americans may be that our Vietnam policy may fail—not because they are wrong, but because our people are confused and disillusioned.

Mr. President, this confusion stems, it seems to me, from three administration weaknesses regarding our policy in Vietnam. The first is the administration's unhealthy obsession with a notion that it is always right and never wrong—or that, at least, it should so present itself.

And second is the administration's overpowering urge to be "all things to all men," to govern by consensus not only in domestic, but in foreign policy. The emphasis, therefore, has been on nullifying domestic and international criticism rather than following a policy best designated to achieve the objectives sought.

And third is what appears to be the administration's aversion to long-range planning, a predisposition of "playing things by ear," of responding rather than taking the initiative.

If one asserts that such weaknesses exist, there is, of course, the responsibility to offer some documentation.

Mr. President, in recent weeks there have been repeated stories of shortages of war materials in Vietnam. Now if we know anything about past military buildups of this sort, we know that such

13410

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

June 23, 1966

shortages inevitably occur. And if these shortages are not the result of gross mismanagement then they constitute another of harsh facts of war—which is organized confusion at best.

But what has been the administration's response to, first, the press disclosures of these shortages and later confirmation by congressional committees? At first they were categorically denied. The Secretary of Defense described them as "baloney," an extreme example of the administration's overreaction of critics and an administration that admits no mistakes; and administration policy which seeks to discredit critics, but which finally only raises new doubts.

And then there was the speech by the distinguished junior Senator from New York [Mr. KENNEDY], who suggested that the United States should negotiate with the Vietcong.

The administration's overreaction once again proposed that, first, they were in agreement; second, that they were in complete disagreement; and, third, that they were "very close to Mr. KENNEDY's views."

This is another illustration of an administration trying to cover all bets, attempting to be all things to all people at all times. But in the meantime, what is our policy? New doubts are raised. New confusions are created.

In the order of things these may be matters of small circumstance, but let us go on to review issues of greater consequence.

In the administration's explanation of the basic reasons as to why we are in Vietnam they speak in generalities.

The administration spokesmen talk of defending freedom and democracy in South Vietnam. These are admirable causes. The very basic tenants of our foreign policy are to expand the boundaries of freedom by means of halting aggression and by means of peaceful persuasion. But admirable as they may be, who among us now really believes there is any real meaningful freedom and democracy in Vietnam or indeed in southeast Asia?

The administration speaks in terms of narrow legalisms, of honoring commitments, of contending that we are bound by the SEATO Treaty. But if we are, other treaty members apparently do not appear to believe that they are so bound. And apparently the administration does not either for it has never really consulted with our allies regarding Vietnam policies. It talks to them in terms of more men and material commitment, but it does not discuss policy or SEATO Treaty obligations.

The administration talks about our commitment by past administrations, by the Kennedy administration and by the Eisenhower administration. These commitments supposedly are binding upon our Government and on our people for which we are honor bound. The truth of the matter is that the Eisenhower commitment was nothing more than a letter to the Diem Government offering economic and technical assistance upon the condition that there would be achieved certain social, economic and political reforms.

Mr. President, the real reason we are in South Vietnam today is to prevent the spread of imperialistic, totalitarian communism into South Vietnam and into the rest of southeast Asia which threatens the peace of the world. This has been a cornerstone of our foreign policy for two decades. It is the basis of the Marshall plan; it was the reason we instituted the airlift into Berlin; that we resisted Soviet-sponsored thrusts into Greece, Iran, and Turkey; it is the reason we opposed conventional warfare in Korea; it is the reason we reacted to the missile crisis in Cuba; and indeed it is the reason we are committed in southeast Asia. And the administration ought to say so. The American people would understand. But to talk about our presence there in terms of treaty commitments, legalistic arguments and talk of a war for freedom and democracy clouds the real reason and creates doubt and confusion.

Let me make reference to another phase of this problem which has long been difficult for the American people to understand. This is our position in regard to negotiations with the Communists. In May 1965 the President, in his now famous Johns Hopkins speech, said we would negotiate anywhere at any time without prior conditions. We then immediately imposed a condition ourselves and that was that we would not negotiate with the Vietcong. Now, Mr. President, there may have been good and valid reasons why we should not negotiate with the National Liberation Front. Certainly we should not negotiate only with the Communists in South Vietnam as Hanoi and Peking would suggest. But here again is more uncertainty.

Note also that every time we escalate our peace effort we also escalate, in like manner, our military effort. One dilutes the other.

In relation to the so-called peace feelers, I would remind the Senate that after our declaration that we would explore all possibilities of negotiation, the American people learned of the overtures through the United Nations, through the Italian Foreign Minister and others only after evidence had come forth to the extent that the administration could no longer deny that they existed. Again these overtures may not have been worthy of consideration. The administration's position may have been absolutely sound. But the administration was discredited when they first denied their existence and then had to acknowledge such contracts after public disclosure.

I make reference also to the so-called peace offensive of January 1966. At that time all will recall that the bombing had stopped. Ambassador Harriman was sent to Poland, Yugoslavia, and India; Mr. McGeorge Bundy went to Ottawa; Ambassador Goldberg was sent to the Vatican, Rome, Paris, and London; the Vice President toured the Far East capitals; Ambassador Kohler called upon those in authority in the Soviet Union; Mr. G. Mennen Williams contacted several African nations; and Mr. Thomas Mann went to Mexico.

This was a massive peace offensive. A

great political display. But even at the time it was underway many felt that the objective was to nullify criticism rather than to find a response to our peace offensive.

The point is if in the past months we had been making the proper diplomatic efforts then this diplomatic spectacular would have been unnecessary. And if we had not been making the proper diplomatic efforts for peace then this jet diplomacy would convince no one.

Let me make reference to the severe problem of government stability in South Vietnam. A great cloud hangs over America's involvement with the numerous Saigon governments.

I specifically make reference to the Honolulu Conference. The situation at that time was that the peace offensive had failed, the bombing had been resumed in the north, the desperately needed economic, social, and political reforms had not taken place, criticism of the administration's position was increasing as manifested by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings. It was precisely at this point that the President, together with his top advisors, went off to a conference with Premier Ky, and here again the general feeling among many was that this was to nullify criticism at home rather than to extend a long range policy.

Secretary McNamara's recent offhand comment that the conflict between the Ky regime and the Buddhists was a healthy sign was either thoughtless or naive.

Now, Mr. President, one can understand the niceties of diplomacy and the delicate circumstances of international relations. But if the United States approves and supports each government, we, in turn, compound the confusion in the minds and in the consciences of our people.

Mr. President, the great confusion lies in the mismatched words and deeds of the administration.

Mr. President, if we are to reduce this to a single proposition, looking back over the long and troubled past, one will see that the administration from time to time has taken a public position that we would commit ourselves only so far, and at the same time the administration asserted that there were certain actions which we would not do and that this scope of commitment would achieve the objectives that we seek. Then inevitably conditions change and the administration does the very act that they promised not to do, whether it be increased troop commitment or some other action. But now they say this new escalation, this new commitment, will solve the Vietnam problem. Yet the solution never comes.

Let me illustrate. In 1964 the President said our objectives can be achieved without American troops. Today there are over 400,000 American troops in North Vietnam.

In 1964 the President indicated that there would be no bombing north of the 17th parallel. At a later time air strikes into North Vietnam became necessary to cut the supply lines, yet supplies continue to flow over the Ho Chi Minh trail in ever-increasing volume.

June 23, 1960

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

13411

If the administration really thought that a limited action and a limited commitment would suffice, then the result is a misjudgment. But if the administration thought that the limited commitments previously made would never suffice, then it constitutes deception. But, in any event, the result is confusion and doubt on the part of the American people.

Mr. President, once again, I say that I will support the position of the administration which is, as I understand it, to be goals of halting Communist aggression in Vietnam and southeast Asia and in securing a free and independent South Vietnam. As I stated, I am persuaded that the American people want to support the administration. I am persuaded that our objectives are right and honorable and worthy. I am convinced that the administration will receive the support of our people if it will only clearly state the reasons for our commitment.

The people of this land are wise enough and strong enough to understand that the lessons in South Vietnam in 1966 are the same lessons of Munich in 1939. I think they are wise enough to understand that freedom of South Vietnam is not the same kind of freedom that we would have for our land and for our people, and they know and expect that the unexpected will occur.

Mr. President, I think the American public can understand a policy of limited action for limited objectives, that they can understand that there is a new concept of victory in a nuclear age and that they are willing to do what is necessary in these times.

Mr. President, one last point. The great wrong of the administration's policy of seeking a consensus in foreign affairs is that not only doubt and confusion have resulted, but it is in the fact that in this doubt and confusion many people have been driven to extreme positions. The simplistic approach of all-out war on one hand or complete withdrawal on the other gains popularity every day. The broad body of thought which understood that there are no simple answers for Vietnam; that understood that there is no "yes or no" answer; that understood that solutions do not appear in black or white shades now is dissolved and the administration's mismatch of words and deeds has led an ever-increasing number of people into extreme positions which can only give way to extreme solutions.

For America, in the midsixties the agony of Vietnam could be the trial for this generation. What we need today is reason, understanding and patience and, Mr. President, these will exist if our goals are clear and if we know where we are going.

CONTAMINATION OF THE COLORADO RIVER BASIN

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. President, repeatedly in recent years I have spoken to the Senate about the increasing hazards to man and his progeny caused by radioactive contamination and pollution of the air we breathe, the water we

drink and the food we eat. I will continue to speak out on this subject.

Radiation exposure is cumulative and it comes from many sources. We are receiving ever greater exposures from the known sources of radiation. We are ever finding new, hitherto unsuspected, sources of radiation. The more monitoring and surveillance of the environment we undertake the more we find which needs to be done.

The newspapers, in a paragraph here a paragraph there, report these increases: We read of Columbia River oysters contaminated by the Hanford Laboratory in Washington, we hear of Eskimos exposed to unusual amounts of radiation in the Arctic, we learn the tributaries of the Colorado River are polluted by the tailings of uranium mills, the American Academy of Pediatrics warns us against use of the fluoroscope and the British Medical Journal Lancet warns us against unnecessary diagnostic X-rays.

All of this is reported; yet it is buried in the rush of the day-to-day news. Nowhere is it all put together. Nowhere are the full implications of the increasing radioactive burdens to man and his environment made clear.

When the test ban treaty was ratified, Federal interest—especially congressional interest—in radiation hazards seemed to fade away. This is unfortunate for as the National Advisory Committee on Radiation pointed out in its report to the Surgeon General this April:

Although the nuclear weapons test ban appeared to reduce the need for environmental surveillance for a time, current world conditions make a continuing effort in this field essential.

Essential as our efforts in this field may be, they are not now even remotely adequate to the problem. It is true that the test ban treaty cut down on the amount of radioactivity released in the air through atmospheric testing by the great powers. It did not reduce, however, the amount released through inadvertent "venting" from underground tests. Neither France nor Red China are affected by the terms of the treaty and both are mounting atmospheric testing programs this summer. The extent and use of radioactive substances in medicine increase substantially each year. The full extent of the ability of certain food chains to absorb radioactive materials is only now being determined. The difficulty of safely disposing of radioactive waste products has yet to be solved. The Federal and State responsibilities in all these fields are unclear and unsettled.

In reviewing these and other matters the National Advisory Committee on Radiation in its report to the Surgeon General has proposed a greatly increased Federal effort to strengthen our research and training programs in radiology, to strengthen our laboratory and statistical resources and to develop standards of acceptable radiation exposure that make clear "the balance of profit and risk" involved in all matters pertaining to the human application of ionizing radiation. The present guidelines are drawn with-

out adequate knowledge and without adequate consultation with representatives of the life scientists. Until now the safety standards on radiation exposure have been administered largely by the men who make the radiation. They are hardly unbiased.

The Advisory Committee report is important, its recommendations are vital. I intend to make sure that it is heard.

Radiation contamination is a problem facing all mankind. It is especially pressing in the United States because of the ever increasing military, medical and industrial uses we are making of radiation materials. In order to draw Senators' attention to the problem, I intend, over the next 3 weeks, to speak on three particularly distressing cases of excessive radiation exposure. In location these range from New York to Arizona, from the Arctic to the Gulf of Mexico.

In the Colorado River Basin, of Colorado, New Mexico, and Utah there are 33 uranium ore-processing mills. Some of these are now shut down; some of these are still open. Beside each there are piles of mill tailings. These are heavily radioactive and in some cases they have seriously contaminated the area about them. Today let me draw the attention of the Senate to two particular examples: the contamination of the San Miguel and the Animas Rivers.

The mills along these two rivers are AEC licensed. This means that they are required by their license to abide by the so-called part 20 regulations which limit the amount of concentrations of radioactivity which can be released from mill sites. These regulations were proposed in 1955 and were adopted in 1957.

Let us see how well they were regarded.

The Federal Government has promulgated radiation protection guides which are to be used in evaluating radiation contamination hazards from peacetime uses of atomic energy. The guides clearly state that radiation exposure should be kept as low as possible. They set forth three ranges of exposure. The first, range I, calls for "periodic confirmatory surveillance as necessary." The second, range II, provides for "quantitative surveillance and routine control." The purpose of this control is defined as providing "reasonable assurance that average rates of intake by a suitable sample of an exposed population group, averaged over the sample and averaged over periods of time of the order of 1 year, do not exceed the upper value of range II."

Range III calls for "evaluation and application of additional control measures as necessary." It is presumed that lengthy exposure to range III levels of radiation would call for active countermeasures in the community or the area: food exchange, crop storage, water treatment, and so forth.

The principal radionuclide released from the uranium mill pilings has been radium 226. The FRC guide for radium specifies that exposure from 0 to 2 picocuries of Ra²²⁶ is in range I; exposure from 2 to 20 picocuries of Ra²²⁶ is in range II and exposure from 20 to 200 of Ra²²⁶ is in range III.

13412

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

June 23, 1966

An average person drinks and eats about 2.2 liters of water a day.

Keep these facts in mind.

In 1955 the San Miguel River contained concentrations of radium 226 as high as 88 picocuries per liter. If any one had been drinking water from this river at that time he would have absorbed 193.6 picocuries of radium a day. This is at the upper limit of range III.

The Animas River in 1959 contained 24 picocuries of radium per liter. A person drinking from this river would have received 52.8 picocuries of radium per day. Again this is a level well within range III.

A polluted river does damage to the entire river environment. For example, the sport fish disappeared from both rivers during the years of maximum pollution. Some hardy fish remained. Minnows taken downstream from the uranium mills in 1958 contained, on an average, 18 times the natural background level of radium contamination. Some samples contained as much as 48 times the natural background level.

Fish taken from the San Miguel River in 1956 and 1957 were as much as 98 times more radioactive than they should have been.

Bottom fauna taken from the Animas River in 1961 contained radium contaminations as much as 30 times greater than normal. Bottom fauna taken from the San Miguel River at the end of 1962, 7 years after the maximum contamination period, still retained concentrations of radium 226 20 times greater than normal.

The radium content of algae from these two rivers was even greater. In 1959 algae taken from the Animas River contained 888 picocuries of radium 226 per gram ashed weight. Compare this with samples of unpolluted algae taken from above the radium mill which contained an average of 4 picocuries per gram. Algae taken from the San Miguel River in 1957 ranged as high as 3,560 picocuries of radium 226 per gram of ashed weight. This is 890 times the level of the unpolluted samples of algae.

There are approximately 25,000 persons living in the Animas River Basin. Fewer persons live along the banks of the San Miguel River. Even so, these people have been drinking treated or untreated river water and have been irrigating their crops with water taken from these rivers. Radiation contamination of alfalfa and hay grown along the Animas River averaged about nine times the normal expected level during the period of maximum contamination. Now several years after, the levels of contamination stand at 70 picocuries per kilogram, about four times the natural concentration of radium 226.

Uranium mills have been operating in the Colorado River Valley since the Second World War. The Atomic Energy Commission began studying the radiation safety aspects of mill operations only in 1957. The AEC began its study of closed mill pilings only in 1963. By that time much water, much radiation, had flowed over the dam.

It may be that the AEC part 20 regulations are adequate to the task of pro-

hibiting such contamination as I have outlined. It may be, but I doubt it. Most of the contamination in the Animas and San Miguel Rivers occurred after the part 20 regulations had been promulgated.

It may be that the pilings at the closed mill sites are properly banked and that there is no danger of their contaminants leaching into the streams or draining into the water table. It may be, but I am not sure of this.

The problem is very real at the closed mill sites in the Colorado River Valley. Radium 226 has a half life of 1,620 years. We must have more than the present temporary measures to guard against the long-lived hazard caused by radium contaminated mill pilings. This problem may become even more important in the years ahead. Uranium is basically a scarce material and uranium production can be expected to rise substantially in the years ahead. It is expected that world demand for uranium will reach about 60,000 tons a year in 1980, a 50-percent increase over present capacity. To meet this demand, it will be necessary to open new mines and mills and to reopen old ones. There is a great deal more uranium in the United States to be mined and prospecting is now going on at a lively level.

Because contamination from pilings is a real and continuing problem, I am pleased that the junior Senator from Maine [Mr. MUSKIE] is holding hearings on the subject before his Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution.

Much valuable evidence has been obtained at these hearings. I am told the subcommittee intends to continue its study and I here pledge to give the committee every assistance and support that I can.

The Colorado River Basin is but one of many hot spots. We are learning only slowly and very tardily how to measure and evaluate the extent of the contamination in the biological food chain and our environment generally. We must train the men, provide the laboratories, and finance the research needed to insure that with the increasing use of radiation products mankind does not inadvertently do his world grave and permanent harm.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a letter of questions which I sent to the chairman on the pollution of the Colorado River Basin as well as replies to these questions from the AEC and the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration and also an article on the increased demand for uranium from May 14 issue of the Economist may be made a part of the RECORD at this time.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

MAY 6, 1966.

Honorable EDMUND S. MUSKIE,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Air and Water
Pollution, Committee on Public Works,
United States Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I deeply regret that I am unable to appear before your subcommittee as it begins its study of the hazards caused by uranium mill tailings piles in the Colorado River basin and as it considers what

public policy should be on such matters. I congratulate you and your subcommittee for undertaking what is a most complicated and dreadfully important inquiry.

As you know, for several years I have worked to expand and improve our research programs on radiation protection. We spend many billions of dollars a year building nuclear weapons; we spend very few dollars a year investigating their effects on man and his environment—both potential and real.

Radiation contamination is of particular concern to Alaskans. The Arctic food chain is highly susceptible to contamination from radioactive fallout. This fallout comes to earth and settles on the Arctic mosses and sedges. These plants receive their nourishment from the air and not from the earth. They live for many years and fallout remains upon them. The mosses are eaten by the wandering herds of caribous, and the caribous become heavily radioactive. The inland Eskimos, citizens of Alaska and the United States of America, are dependent in large part for their protein on caribou meat. And as a result, the ingestion of radionuclides by the inland Arctic Eskimos is many times greater than the average for Americans across the 48 United States. It approaches, indeed sometimes exceeds, the maximum permissible levels as set by the Radiation Protection Guide. Attached to this letter you will find several speeches which I have given to the Senate discussing this problem in great detail. I would ask that the subcommittee make these speeches a part of its hearing record.

As a result of these speeches and the concern of scientists and others, I have been successful in obtaining improved monitoring and surveillance programs for Arctic Alaska. The situation is being closely watched and counter measures are being studied so that we will be prepared to insure the safety and health of the Alaska Eskimos.

Alaska is not the only place where radiation problems cause concern. The appalling amounts of Iodine 131 which have fallen over parts of Nevada and southern Utah are only now being fully investigated. It may well be that the levels absorbed by the children in that area of the country have been sufficiently great to cause measurable somatic effects.

Your subcommittee, Mr. Chairman, today is taking up a problem no less grave. The pollution by way of uranium mill tailings sliding into the tributaries of the Colorado River apparently has been—and may well still be—extensive. A close reading of the report of the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration indicates that in three rivers at least, levels of radiation have been reached which exceed the so-called maximum permissible levels as established by the National Council on Radiation Protection.

In 1955 the San Miguel River contained concentrations of radium-226 as high as 88 picograms per liter. In 1961 South Creek had concentrations measured at 27 picograms per liter. In 1959 the Animas River contained 24 picograms per liter of radium-226. According to the Radiation Protection Guide anything more than 2 picocuries of radium-226 absorbed per day by a large scale of population group would call for federal "quantitative surveillance and routine control." According to the Guide, anything more than 20 picocuries per day would call for "evaluation and application of additional control measures"—this is commonly taken to mean the application of counter measures.

A picogram of radium-226 taken internally will produce the equivalent of a picocure of radiation.

An average person drinks and eats about 2.2 liters of water a day.

Senate

THURSDAY, JUNE 23, 1966

The Senate met at 11 o'clock a.m., and was called to order by the Acting President pro tempore (Mr. METCALF).

The Chaplain, Rev. Frederick Brown Harris, D.D., offered the following prayer:

O Lord our God, whose love is so gracious and tender that it passeth understanding, we bow before Thee in gratitude at the remembrance of Thy mercies. Bring us, we beseech Thee, into the quiet sanctuary of Thy presence that we may be still and know that Thou art God.

In spite of all the evil that stalks the earth with shackles and chains, we thank Thee for human kindness, for hope that shines undimmed, for faith that is dauntless, and for all the qualities of high personality that cannot be bought. Let Thy beauty, O Lord, be upon us, that our spirits may be radiant as in Thy strength we face the perplexities of these troubled days. Use us, we pray Thee, as ambassadors of good will. At the end, without stumbling or stain, strengthen our arms as in all the world we fight for righteousness and justice and truth.

We ask it in the name of that One who is the life and truth and the way. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

On request of Mr. MANSFIELD, and by unanimous consent, the reading of the Journal of the proceedings of Wednesday, June 22, 1966, was dispensed with.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT

A message in writing from the President of the United States, submitting nominations, was communicated to the Senate by Mr. Jones, one of his secretaries.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Hackney, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had agreed to the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 12270) to authorize the Secretary of Defense to lend certain Army, Navy, and Air Force equipment and to provide transportation and other services to the Boy Scouts of America in connection with the 12th Boy Scouts World Jamboree and 21st Boy Scouts World Conference to be held in the United States of America in 1967, and for other purposes.

The message also announced that the House had passed a bill (H.R. 15119) to extend and improve the Federal-State unemployment compensation program, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate.

ENROLLED BILLS SIGNED

The message further announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the following enrolled bills, and they were signed by the Vice President:

H.R. 1582. An act to remove a restriction on certain real property heretofore conveyed to the State of California;

H.R. 3438. An act to amend the Bankruptcy Act with respect to limiting the priority and nondischargeability of taxes in bankruptcy;

H.R. 7371. An act to amend the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956; and

H.R. 10721. An act to amend the Federal Employees' Compensation Act to improve its benefits, and for other purposes.

HOUSE BILL REFERRED

The bill (H.R. 15119) to extend and improve the Federal-State unemployment compensation program, was read twice by its title and referred to the Committee on Finance.

LIMITATION ON STATEMENTS DURING TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at the conclusion of the speech to be delivered by the distinguished junior Senator from Michigan [Mr. GRIFFIN], which I understand is not to exceed 45 minutes, there be a period for the transaction of routine morning business, with statements to be limited to 3 minutes.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, once again I wish to state that after the Senate disposes of the metal and non-metallic mine safety bill, which will be the pending business at the conclusion of the morning hour, it is our intention to take up tomorrow the Traffic Safety Act. I urge all Senators to be in the city and available for attendance in the Chamber, because there may be amendments to be voted on.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the Chair recognizes the Senator from Michigan.

(At this point Mr. McGEE assumed the chair as the Presiding Officer.)

UNITED STATES ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO VIETNAM

Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, I rise to make my first speech in this Chamber,

at an hour of testing in the history of the Republic.

Ten thousand miles from this Chamber, on the other side of our planet, more than 300,000 young Americans are engaged in fighting an enemy who is everywhere and nowhere—an enemy who walks barefoot through the rice paddies of the Mekong Delta and rides through the streets of Saigon on a bicycle carrying a bomb.

Mr. President, I served 14 months overseas during World War II, and I do not claim to be a military expert. Recently, I spent 5 days, from May 9 to May 14, in Vietnam as a member of the House Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Government Information, studying the commodity import program of the U.S. Agency for International Development. I do not come back and profess to be an expert on all the problems of Vietnam. During my visit in Vietnam, I had an opportunity to meet and engage in discussions with our top military, political, and economic representatives, with our soldiers in the field, and with the Vietnamese people themselves.

With all humility, I offer some assessments and conclusions. I earnestly hope that they will contribute to a better understanding of the problems we face in Vietnam. For one need not be an expert to realize that in Vietnam we are confronted with a new and terrible kind of war—terrorism that makes pawns of the innocent, and severely tests the morale, the loyalty, and the steadfastness of the civilian population.

In Vietnam the economic and political know-how of the 20th century is struggling to bring nationhood out of subversion, and some order out of chaos.

Whether South Vietnam, with the military and economic help of the United States, will be able to survive this ordeal, no one can predict with certainty. Militarily speaking, I believe we can see some light at the end of the tunnel; however, the possibility continues that the tunnel may cave in before we reach the end.

THE CHALLENGE OF COMMUNIST TERROR

I should like to suggest that two wars are raging in Vietnam today: one is the war to defeat the Communist Vietcong in the countryside and in the villages of the south and to repel overt aggression from the north; the other is the war to win the people, so that they can create a viable political, social, and economic order—in short, so that they can build a nation.

South Vietnam is a relatively small country. Its trained leaders are even fewer in relation to its size. Yet, in a

June 23, 1966

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

13105

By Mr. CAMERON:

H.R. 15921. A bill to amend the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 to provide insurance for loans made to assist in the creation of employment opportunities for low-income persons; to the Committee on Education and Labor.

By Mr. HAWKINS:

H.R. 15922. A bill to amend the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 to provide insurance for loans made to assist in the creation of employment opportunities for low-income persons; to the Committee on Education and Labor.

By Mr. McFALL:

H.R. 15923. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to permit the withholding of Federal income taxes for employees of certain water districts; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. McCARTHY:

H.R. 15924. A bill to regulate interstate and foreign commerce by preventing the use of unfair or deceptive methods of packaging or labeling of certain consumer commodities distributed in such commerce, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. TALCOTT:

H.J. Res. 1179. Joint resolution to establish the American Revolution Bicentennial Commission, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. CRALEY:

H. Con. Res. 796. Concurrent resolution expressing the sense of the Congress with respect to certain matters in connection with the 225th anniversary of the founding of York, Pa.; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. McCARTHY:

H. Con. Res. 797. Concurrent resolution expressing the sense of Congress on the hold-

ing of elections in South Vietnam; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. MATSUNAGA:

H. Con. Res. 798. Concurrent resolution establishing a Joint Committee on National Service and the Draft; to the Committee on Rules.

PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 1 of rule XXII, private bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. CAREY:

H.R. 15925. A bill for the relief of Giuseppe D'Angelo, his wife, Rose D'Angelo, and Onofrio D'Angelo and his wife, Francesca D'Angelo; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H.R. 15926. A bill for the relief of Vittorio Mancuso; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. COHELAN:

H.R. 15927. A bill for the relief of James Rodriguez Garcia (also known as Jaime Wilson and Jaime Betia); to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. MACKAY:

H.R. 15928. A bill for the relief of Mrs. Ruth Brunner; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. MORSE:

H.R. 15929. A bill for the relief of Mr. Salehhal Shamsi and Mrs. Sakina Shamsi; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. MULTER:

H.R. 15930. A bill for the relief of Andrea Ventimiglia; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. O'HARA of Illinois:

H.R. 15931. A bill for the relief of Ilieja Kalember; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. POWELL:

H.R. 15932. A bill for the relief of Giovanni Fiorini; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. ROSTENKOWSKI:

H.R. 15933. A bill for the relief of Kazimiera Niemirowska; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. ROYBAL:

H.R. 15934. A bill for the relief of Miss Jai Ok Yuh; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H.R. 15935. A bill for the relief of Abdallah Hanna Abi Monsour; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. ST GERMAIN:

H.R. 15936. A bill for the relief of Maria De Jesus Da Silva Ferreira; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H.R. 15937. A bill for the relief of Maria Inez Pacheco de Andrade Medeiros; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. TEAGUE of Texas:

H.R. 15938. A bill for the relief of Julio Cesar Gon Martinez; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. WALDIE:

H.R. 15939. A bill for the relief of certain employees of the Naval Weapons Center, Concord, Calif.; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. WOLFF:

H.R. 15940. A bill for the relief of Thalia Simos; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

PETITIONS, ETC.

Under clause 1 of rule XXII,

402. The SPEAKER presented a petition of Ralph Borysewski, Rochester, N.Y., relative to impeachment, which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

June 25, 1966

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

13407

period of 2 years more than 600 village headmen and civil servants were killed by the Communist Vietcong, and over 1,400 kidnapped. Imagine the sense of terror which would pervade America if every good mayor and every good public servant in the United States risked death or kidnaping at the hands of Communist gangsters! Yet, this is the situation in South Vietnam.

In its total context, the war in Vietnam cannot, and will not, be won merely by dropping bombs or by taking over Vietcong territory. In the final analysis, to win this total effort, a nation must be rebuilt out of the chaos, confusion, and corruption left in the wake of 25 years of continuous strife and conflict. To succeed, we must be as skillful and ingenious with the tools of nation building as our fighting men are skillful and ingenious with the weapons of battle.

No matter how many military engagements are won by American soldiers, the war will surely be lost if our civilian personnel fail in their education, health, and economic programs—in the nation building aspects of the total effort. And, every shortcoming and failure in our economic assistance and development program serve only to prolong the war.

THE WEAKEST LINK

In my judgment, based on my recent visit to Vietnam, the weakest link in U.S. activities is, inexorably, the economic one. I am very much disturbed to report that our largest economic assistance program in Vietnam has not been well handled. As a result of serious mismanagement and ineffective controls, U.S. import subsidies have brought boom to the black markets of Saigon; they have made the rich richer and the poor poorer; and they have indirectly routed American supplies into the hands of the Communist Vietcong.

The program to which I refer is the commodity import program. Through it the U.S. Agency for International Development—AID—provides indirect budget support for financing the importation into Vietnam of capital goods, raw materials and consumer goods.

Over the years, the commodity import program has grown to the point where it represents the major portion of our foreign aid package in Vietnam. For the current fiscal year, approximately \$370 million has been budgeted for the commodity import program in Vietnam—well over half of our total economic aid commitment to that country. Unfortunately, the rapid expansion of this program, which has resulted in an almost unmanageable influx of commodities, has not been accompanied by an equivalent expansion in the number of competent AID administrators, or in the system of controls.

The commodity import program was originally designed, first, to shore up the Vietnamese Government's foreign currency reserves by cutting down on their foreign expenditures; second, to provide additional government revenues to balance their budget; and third, and most important, to help combat inflation in Vietnam.

This well-intentioned but, unfortunately, not well-administered program works something like this:

First. The Saigon Government maintains a list of approved importers in Vietnam. A firm or individual on the list has a tremendous opportunity for realizing profit, licit and illicit.

Second. Only approved importers are eligible to apply for a license to import particular goods. Yet our AID officials have paid little or no attention to the list of approved importers, or to the granting of import licenses. There has been no reliable system of checking on the backgrounds, honesty, loyalties or secret connections of the import applicants. Administration of the import licensing system has been left almost entirely to Vietnamese officials. Although licenses are supposed to be issued without charge, it is common knowledge in Saigon that an "under the table" payment to the appropriate local official is "part of the game."

Third. By using his privileged authority, a Vietnamese importer can obtain an import license—say, for the import of \$10,000 worth of cement—by paying the Vietnamese Government in local currency at the "pegged" bargain rate of 60 piasters to \$1. I am speaking here of the period prior to last week's devaluation of the piaster. The exporter, who may be in the United States or a third country, is paid by the U.S. Government in dollars.

Fourth. Upon obtaining the imported goods, the importer remains virtually unchecked—at least, this has been the case in the past—in his methods of disposal. He can—and often does—sell the goods on the Saigon black market where the going exchange rate has ranged between 160 and 180 piasters to the dollar. The spread between the official rate and the "down on the corner" exchange rate insures a real windfall profit for the importer. He can nearly triple his original investment in piasters.

But he need not stop there. Other avenues for profiteering have been open to the resourceful importer.

By working through a "cooperative" foreign sales agent, the importer can arrange for the seller to make a kick-back to him on a part of the sales price. Overstatement of invoice prices, short shipments, or shipment of inferior goods are other devices for realizing profits from a generous Uncle Sam. Kick-back payments may actually go to the importer in Saigon through a sales representative, or they may take the form of a transfer of funds between foreign banks.

A large percentage of the goods brought into Vietnam under the commodity import program are supposed to be purchased from the United States. But if Uncle Sam is paying no attention, shipping documents can easily be falsified as to the country of origin. This makes it simpler to get dollars into French or Swiss banks.

In a recent series of syndicated columns on the profiteering in Vietnam, economics consultant Eliot Janeway has written:

The business of latching on to war dollars has grown into the only really big business there (in Vietnam). . . . Of the \$600 million outflow to Vietnam, nearly half (roughly 20 percent of our worrisome [balance of] payments deficit) goes right back to France as ammunition for her war against

the dollar. Back when the French were paying for their own war in Vietnam, they complained against the profiteering there which created a vested interest in keeping troops bogged down in Vietnam.

DIVERSION OF U.S.-FINANCED IMPORTS TO THE ENEMY

Profiteering by unscrupulous importers and, in some cases, exporters is not the only shocking example of laxity of control over the administration of the commodity import program. Expansion of the program at a faster rate than AID could recruit qualified administrators has apparently resulted in the most outrageous attack upon the taxpayers' dollars yet—the diversion of the U.S.-financed imports to the enemy and the smuggling of supplies out of Vietnam for resale in other areas.

For example, on May 9 the New York Times reported:

The possibility that United States taxpayers may indirectly be financing the Viet Cong through the import program is a continuing headache to AID officials. Enough diverted supplies have been recovered from the Viet Cong to suggest that much more has gone the same route.

Evidence has been presented in the press and elsewhere, including the committee in the other body on which I served, to substantiate these reports. For example, there is reason to believe that American steel has been used to re-enforce Vietcong bunkers; that American steel has been used by the Vietcong to fashion homemade mortars; that small machine equipment, medicines, and other items have been pilfered from the docks in Saigon—actually under the noses of AID officials—and transferred to the Vietcong; and that rice, imported from Texas and Louisiana, has been smuggled from Vietnam into Cambodia, making that country, according to the New York Times: "the fastest growing exporter of the staple in southeast Asia."

In the May 10 issue of the New York Times Felix Belair, Jr., wrote:

Nobody in the Agency for International Development here (in Washington) or in Saigon knows on anything like a current basis how much (of the imports) has arrived or where it went.

In the circumstances, "estimates" that 20 percent of AID-financed shipments are stolen in transit or from the docks and warehouses or otherwise diverted go unchallenged because there are no figures to refute them.

THE NEED TO HELP THE 80 PERCENT OF THE PEOPLE

The profiteering by unscrupulous elements in the cities and ports of Vietnam is naturally demoralizing to the great mass of the people faced with suffering and terrorism inflicted by the Communist Vietcong. It must be stopped if we are going to win the 80 percent of the Vietnamese population who live as peasants in the countryside.

In the May 5 issue of the Reporter magazine, Stanley Andrews, a noted authority on rural development who spent a number of years in Vietnam, said:

Perhaps no more than 10 to 20 percent of American aid has trickled down to the hamlets in a way the peasants can relate to either the United States or their own Government . . . Most of the aid has benefited the elite and the urban middle class.

13408

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

June 2, 1966

WHO IS TO BLAME?

A good part of the blame for the past and present situation in Vietnam must be laid at the door of top AID officials.

Consider these facts about the AID mission in Vietnam:

First. On March 26, 1966, AID mission personnel in Vietnam totaled approximately 2,800 which is nearly the number stationed in Washington. However, until recently there were only a handful of American AID employees in Vietnam whose principal concern was the administration of the commodity import program. A year ago there was only one such employee.

Second. While I was in Vietnam, four key administrative posts, including the position of Deputy Director, were vacant.

Third. There have been four different Directors of the Vietnam AID mission during the past 4 years.

Fourth. There have been few audits of the AID operation in Vietnam. At the time of our visit, there had been no audits of the operation by AID-Washington since 1961. Controls and supervision over the commodity import program by Washington or Saigon have been minimal or nonexistent.

In other words, the AID agency in Washington and Saigon has been "looking the other way." Its personnel policies have been inadequate. During the past 5 years there have been no meaningful measures to check or audit this vital program.

Since the House Foreign Operations Subcommittee took an interest in this problem several months ago, however, I am pleased to report that the attitude in Washington has been changing. In recent weeks three high level teams have been dispatched to Saigon to investigate, including the Inspector General for Foreign Assistance, the Controller of AID, and a high level team from the General Accounting Office.

These are important—although disastrously late—first steps toward improving the administration of the commodity import program. I trust these firsthand observations will help to spur meaningful reforms.

WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?

In the long run, peace in South Vietnam means political security and economic progress for the people. The United States, alone, cannot supply these vital commodities under any foreign aid program, but we can help the Vietnamese if they will help themselves.

Our military men are doing their job. But when soldiers are dying in battle for the cause of South Vietnam's freedom, our civilian personnel must also perform up to the same standards. In many respects, their responsibilities are more subtle, more complex, and more difficult than military objectives. One thing is certain, this economic and social challenge will not be met just by throwing U.S. funds around as if they were hand grenades in a battle.

Specifically, I would recommend four steps to be taken right now to upgrade our civilian programs in Vietnam.

First, I propose the establishment of an Executive Service Corps patterned along the lines of the Peace Corps. I

believe greater incentives must be provided to attract businessmen and others with special training and experience to serve as civilians in the "other war" in Vietnam. We need to put to work the best talents and the genius of American enterprise in this total effort.

I envision a program that would stimulate greater interest among American businessmen to serve their Government on a longer term basis than is currently the case.

The program might involve an expansion of principles and guidelines already laid by the successful International Executive Service Corps, which is a private nonprofit group of volunteer businessmen who have served in such countries as Iran and Taiwan, but not in Vietnam.

The Executive Service Corps should encourage executives to take a 1- to 3-year leave from their businesses—with loss of position or status—to serve the country overseas while enlarging their own administrative experience. Such an infusion of talent would provide a real "shot in the arm" for the AID program in Vietnam and, at the same time, it could open the way for more meaningful cooperation between the business community and Government in the whole field of economic development.

Second, a team of auditors and investigators must be stationed in Vietnam—not to execute the profiteers, but to show simply and firmly that the United States insists upon honest accounting for its funds. By cutting back and stopping the "under the table" profits in Saigon, we would help significantly to combat the traditional country-city hostility in Vietnam and spread the benefits of U.S. aid more equitably among the South Vietnamese people.

Third, career incentives should be developed to attract the most competent and dedicated AID personnel to serve in Vietnam. This could be accomplished by requiring successful service in a crisis area like Vietnam as a condition of promotion above a certain level, or by permitting AID or Foreign Service personnel with responsibilities in Vietnam to be eligible for promotion within a shorter period, or by screening AID personnel for Vietnam so carefully that such an assignment would be considered an indication of superior ability. There are many ways, within the AID organization, to insure that only the best are sent to Vietnam, but so far, to my knowledge, these methods have not been fully employed.

Fourth, additional programs are needed to reach the rural areas—which, after all, contain 80 percent of the Vietnamese people. They must be programs that do not pour black market money into the countryside. Such programs should offer realistic and practical help in farming, irrigation, transportation, health, and the like. Community clinics for such endemic ills as trachoma, and sympathetic treatment for civilians wounded by military actions, for example, would have a far-reaching impact upon the South Vietnamese people.

THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE

The ultimate objective for South Vietnam is nationhood. But the South Viet-

namese, not the United States, must build it. As Americans strive and look forward to peace and a day when meaningful elections will be held—when the South Vietnamese will freely select their own government—we must not forget that in the long run the United States cannot rule, the Vietnamese people—we cannot govern for them.

Mr. President, while I was in Vietnam, I spent a part of a day with the U.S. Marines in the Da Nang area visiting a small village—actually a hamlet—where about 35 or 40 people live. The marines had helped to build a very crude school for the youngsters in that hamlet; it was apparent that the Marine Corps is concentrating particular attention on the Vietnamese children. Throughout the Da Nang area our marines are taking a very real personal interest in the people of the villages and hamlets, working with them on their agricultural problems, helping them find ways to irrigate the fields and to grow more rice, and helping to provide security during the harvest. At a nearby children's hospital built and operated by our marines, Vietnamese nurses were being paid by the marines out of their own pockets.

The marines that I visited in the Da Nang area represent the kind of example that Americans must hold out to the people of Vietnam. Surely, it is not asking too much to expect that U.S. civilian personnel in the "other war" will demonstrate a comparable interest and competency, and that our AID programs will be administered efficiently and effectively. This is the least that American civilians can do while American servicemen are sacrificing their lives. At present, unfortunately, it is more than we are doing.

Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, will the Senator from Michigan yield?

Mr. GRIFFIN. I am happy to yield to the Senator from California.

Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, I would like to say, with respect to the lucid address to which the Senate has just listened, that as an American, I am delighted to greet our new and able colleague from Michigan.

As a Republican, I am particularly grateful that one with his background in American government now graces this Chamber.

I believe it was my late, great, and illustrious predecessor, Hiram Johnson, who on one occasion said, "In war, the first casualty is truth." It is an aspect of this problem which the distinguished junior Senator from Michigan has outlined so carefully to the Senate today. I trust that his message will carry beyond this Senate to the executive branch of the Government. These problems have arisen in the heat of conflict; a conflict which certainly involves the honor and integrity of the American system. They must be brought to the attention of the American people. Action must be taken to increase our scrutiny of the manner in which our commodity import program is being conducted in South Vietnam today.

In view of the gravity of the charges which have been made and the specific recommendations which our able col-

June 23, 1966

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

13409

league has laid down, there is, I believe, a duty incumbent upon the executive branch of the Government to respond to this challenge posed by the Senator from Michigan. It should indicate to the Senator and to the Senate how it intends to improve the procedures and how it intends to remove the apparently tremendous opportunity for corruption that exists in the use of the commodity import program.

I would also like to state to my able friend from Michigan that I thoroughly applaud his excellent and constructive suggestion that businessmen in America devote their knowledge and experience to the business of the Government of the United States for a temporary period of time. In this manner, they can bring their unique and successful qualifications under the free enterprise system to bear in the exceedingly important cause of freemen 10,000 miles from this Chamber.

There is also a great deal of pride for all Americans, to be found in what our young men in the U.S. Marine Corps did with respect to the civilian population of South Vietnam. The Senator from Michigan has ably drawn our attention to the outstanding efforts of our fighting men in the small hamlets and villages in the rural part of that tragic and melancholy land. I was particularly proud to know that our men in uniform have assisted young people in constructing schools and the local, indigenous population in improving agriculture.

Now I should like to ask the Senator a question. In the Senator's opinion, is our civilian aid program working with the civilian aims of our military personnel in that country?

Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, first, I thank my distinguished colleague from California for his very kind observations.

I think, generally speaking, that there is close cooperation and liaison between our AID agency in Vietnam and our military. I elaborate on my statement by emphasizing that my criticism is not focused, or is not intended to be focused, on all aspects of our AID program in Vietnam. I am particularly pointing out the commodity import program.

I also want to emphasize that we have many fine, competent, dedicated people in Vietnam in the AID agency. They are not all incompetent, by any means. Particularly in the pacification program, for example, we have people in the AID agency who are out in the countryside, incurring considerable personal risk, and who are doing a very fine job in some of the same areas in which the marines are doing it. When I mentioned the marines, I do not wish to imply that that is the only part of the military that is doing this work with the people there. It just happens that I had an opportunity to be in the field with the marines.

I hope, with that elaboration, perhaps the address I have made today will be placed in a proper perspective.

Mr. KUCHEL. The Senator has indeed done just that. What prompted my interest was an opportunity I had to speak with some returning military and civilian personnel over the last year. Our conversations reflected the views of

the able Senator in that we do have excellent and able American civilians in that area. Some of them raised considerable question, in connection with our Appropriations Committee function, that perhaps there was not sufficient attention given to the problems of the civilian population. As the Senator has said, 80 percent of the people in Vietnam live in rural areas. It is in these small villages and hamlets, where such problems as inadequate sanitation and antiquated techniques of agriculture and the like, offer a tremendous opportunity for this fine program to help the civilian population and the cause for freedom.

I would like to thank the Senator for his admirable presentation and for his lucid response to my question. I would again like to welcome the Senator from Michigan to the Senate and to thank him for his able and constructive speech.

Mr. GRIFFIN. I thank the Senator.

I also wish to express appreciation to the majority leader for making it possible for me to make this speech at this time.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I am glad we had the opportunity to have the Senator make his speech.

Mr. PEARSON. Mr. President, let me say that I regret that committee assignment responsibility prevented me from being on the floor when the distinguished Senator from Michigan [Mr. GRIFFIN] addressed the Chamber. His experience in that troubled area, his great record in Congress, have enabled him to give to our own colleagues, and indeed to the Nation, a great insight into the problems to which he has directed attention.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Kansas [Mr. PEARSON] be allowed to speak for 5 minutes, and I also ask unanimous consent that thereafter the Senator from Alaska [Mr. BARTLETTI] may be allowed to speak for 30 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.

VIETNAM CREDIBILITY GAP

Mr. PEARSON. Mr. President, on May 29 Radio Moscow devoted some attention to the speech I made on this floor on May 27 wherein the Soviets indicated that yet another U.S. Senator had criticized the President for his Vietnam policy.

I would not expect to be correctly reported or correctly interpreted by Radio Moscow, but I shall not let their misrepresentation go without response.

Mr. President, I support a policy aimed at the containment of communism in southeast Asia; the halting of Communist aggression and the guarantee of an independent and a peaceful South Vietnam.

But, Mr. President, what I sought to interpret on May 27 is some meaning as to why the American people are concerned and confused about our commitment and about our participation in Vietnam. For the truth of the matter is that our Nation is at war. Our objec-

tives are honorable and worthy. The American people genuinely want to support the President in any international crisis.

Yet to the average citizen whose support is so vital in our democratic system we appear to be helpless victims of a situation we cannot control; that the most powerful Nation in the world cannot determine its own destiny; and that while we know where we have been, it is impossible to guess where we will be in the future.

Why is there such uncertainty and confusion? Why do the polls and the surveys indicate a lack of support for the President who acts as the Commander in Chief of a nation which has always responded with great unity in times of international confrontations?

The inevitable answer was that the administration's position was not believable. There was a lack of credibility. And in the Washington lexicon of the day there existed a "credibility gap."

With some due candor I would assume that this is a result of partisan politics in an election year. Yet the most vociferous critics are members of the President's party. And one cannot overlook the fact that there continue to be a growing number of newspaper editors and columnists who are constrained to question our policy.

So, while the ever-present partisan politics is always present, this lack of belief in the administration's policy must be caused by something else. And that something else is a mismatch between words and deeds, a contradiction between ends and means and a conflict in statements and actions which have existed over a long period of time and which in turn brings about that slow erosion of public confidence.

Therefore, the tragedy of the most agonizing episode in the midsixties for all Americans may be that our Vietnam policy may fail—not because they are wrong, but because our people are confused and disillusioned.

Mr. President, this confusion stems, it seems to me, from three administration weaknesses regarding our policy in Vietnam. The first is the administration's unhealthy obsession with a notion that it is always right and never wrong—or that, at least, it should so present itself.

And second is the administration's overpowering urge to be "all things to all men," to govern by consensus not only in domestic, but in foreign policy. The emphasis, therefore, has been on nullifying domestic and international criticism rather than following a policy best designated to achieve the objectives sought.

And third is what appears to be the administration's aversion to long-range planning, a predisposition of "playing things by ear," of responding rather than taking the initiative.

If one asserts that such weaknesses exist, there is, of course, the responsibility to offer some documentation.

Mr. President, in recent weeks there have been repeated stories of shortages of war materials in Vietnam. Now if we know anything about past military buildups of this sort, we know that such

13410

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

June 3, 1966

shortages inevitably occur. And if these shortages are not the result of gross mismanagement then they constitute only another of harsh facts of war—which is organized confusion at best.

But what has been the administration's response to, first, the press disclosures of these shortages and later confirmation by congressional committees?

At first they were categorically denied. The Secretary of Defense described them as "baloney," an extreme example of the administration's overreaction of critics and an administration that admits no mistakes; and administration policy which seeks to discredit critics, but which finally only raises new doubts.

And then there was the speech by the distinguished junior Senator from New York [Mr. KENNEDY], who suggested that the United States should negotiate with the Vietcong.

The administration's overreaction once again proposed that, first, they were in agreement; second, that they were in complete disagreement; and, third, that they were "very close to Mr. KENNEDY's views."

This is another illustration of an administration trying to cover all bets, attempting to be all things to all people at all times. But in the meantime, what is our policy? New doubts are raised. New confusions are created.

In the order of things these may be matters of small circumstance, but let us go on to review issues of greater consequence.

In the administration's explanation of the basic reasons as to why we are in Vietnam they speak in generalities.

The administration spokesmen talk of defending freedom and democracy in South Vietnam. These are admirable causes. The very basic tenants of our foreign policy are to expand the boundaries of freedom by means of halting aggression and by means of peaceful persuasion. But admirable as they may be, who among us now really believes there is any real meaningful freedom and democracy in Vietnam or indeed in southeast Asia?

The administration speaks in terms of narrow legalisms, of honoring commitments, of contending that we are bound by the SEATO Treaty. But if we are, other treaty members apparently do not appear to believe that they are so bound. And apparently the administration does not either for it has never really consulted with our allies regarding Vietnam policies. It talks to them in terms of more men and material commitment, but it does not discuss policy or SEATO Treaty obligations.

The administration talks about our commitment by past administrations, by the Kennedy administration and by the Eisenhower administration. These commitments supposedly are binding upon our Government and on our people for which we are honor bound. The truth of the matter is that the Eisenhower commitment was nothing more than a letter to the Diem Government offering economic and technical assistance upon the condition that there would be achieved certain social, economic and political reforms.

Mr. President, the real reason we are in South Vietnam today is to prevent the spread of imperialistic, totalitarian communism into South Vietnam and into the rest of southeast Asia which threatens the peace of the world. This has been a cornerstone of our foreign policy for two decades. It is the basis of the Marshall plan; it was the reason we instituted the airlift into Berlin; that we resisted Soviet-sponsored thrusts into Greece, Iran, and Turkey; it is the reason we opposed conventional warfare in Korea; it is the reason we reacted to the missile crisis in Cuba; and indeed it is the reason we are committed in southeast Asia. And the administration ought to say so. The American people would understand. But to talk about our presence there in terms of treaty commitments, legalistic arguments and talk of a war for freedom and democracy clouds the real reason and creates doubt and confusion.

Let me make reference to another phase of this problem which has long been difficult for the American people to understand. This is our position in regard to negotiations with the Communists. In May 1965 the President, in his now famous Johns Hopkins speech, said we would negotiate anywhere at any time without prior conditions. We then immediately imposed a condition ourselves and that was that we would not negotiate with the Vietcong. Now, Mr. President, there may have been good and valid reasons why we should not negotiate with the National Liberation Front. Certainly we should not negotiate only with the Communists in South Vietnam as Hanoi and Peking would suggest. But here again is more uncertainty.

Note also that every time we escalate our peace effort we also escalate, in like manner, our military effort. One dilutes the other.

In relation to the so-called peace feelers, I would remind the Senate that after our declaration that we would explore all possibilities of negotiation, the American people learned of the overtures through the United Nations, through the Italian Foreign Minister and others only after evidence had come forth to the extent that the administration could no longer deny that they existed. Again these overtures may not have been worthy of consideration. The administration's position may have been absolutely sound. But the administration was discredited when they first denied their existence and then had to acknowledge such contracts after public disclosure.

I make reference also to the so-called peace offensive of January 1966. At that time all will recall that the bombing had stopped. Ambassador Harriman was sent to Poland, Yugoslavia, and India; Mr. McGeorge Bundy went to Ottawa; Ambassador Goldberg was sent to the Vatican, Rome, Paris, and London; the Vice President toured the Far East capitals; Ambassador Kohler called upon those in authority in the Soviet Union; Mr. G. Mennen Williams contacted several African nations; and Mr. Thomas Mann went to Mexico.

This was a massive peace offensive. A

great political display. But even at the time it was underway many felt that the objective was to nullify criticism rather than to find a response to our peace offensive.

The point is if in the past months we had been making the proper diplomatic efforts then this diplomatic spectacular would have been unnecessary. And if we had not been making the proper diplomatic efforts for peace then this jet diplomacy would convince no one.

Let me make reference to the severe problem of government stability in South Vietnam. A great cloud hangs over America's involvement with the numerous Saigon governments.

I specifically make reference to the Honolulu Conference. The situation at that time was that the peace offensive had failed, the bombing had been resumed in the north, the desperately needed economic, social, and political reforms had not taken place, criticism of the administration's position was increasing as manifested by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings. It was precisely at this point that the President, together with his top advisors, went off to a conference with Premier Ky, and here again the general feeling among many was that this was to nullify criticism at home rather than to extend a long range policy.

Secretary McNamara's recent offhand comment that the conflict between the Ky regime and the Buddhists was a healthy sign was either thoughtless or naive.

Now, Mr. President, one can understand the niceties of diplomacy and the delicate circumstances of international relations. But if the United States approves and supports each government, we, in turn, compound the confusion in the minds and in the consciences of our people.

Mr. President, the great confusion lies in the mismatched words and deeds of the administration.

Mr. President, if we are to reduce this to a single proposition, looking back over the long and troubled past, one will see that the administration from time to time has taken a public position that would commit ourselves only so far, and at the same time the administration asserted that there were certain actions which we would not do and that the scope of commitment would achieve the objectives that we seek. Then inevitably conditions change and the administration does the very act that they promised not to do, whether it be increased troop commitment or some other action. But now they say this new escalation, this new commitment, will solve the Vietnam problem. Yet the solution never comes.

Let me illustrate. In 1964 the President said our objectives can be achieved without American troops. Today there are over 400,000 American troops in North Vietnam.

In 1964 the President indicated that there would be no bombing north of the 17th parallel. At a later time air strikes into North Vietnam became necessary to cut the supply lines, yet supplies continue to flow over the Ho Chi Minh trail in ever-increasing volume.

June 23, 1966

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE

13373

electric cooperatives. Therefore, I believe every Member of this body will benefit from reading the careful discussion of the British Columbia financing scheme as reported in Barron's. For this reason, I will insert this article in its entirety at this point in my remarks:

[From Barron's, June 13, 1966]

THE PEACE MONGERS—A NOTE ON THE BRITISH COLUMBIA HYDRO AND POWER AUTHORITY

"British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority has filed a registration statement with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission relating to a proposed public offering of \$50,000,000 of Sinking Fund Bonds, Series Y, due July 2, 1991. The underwriting group will be headed by Kuhn, Loeb & Co., The First Boston Corp., Halsey, Stuart & Co., Inc., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., Allen & Co., W. E. Hutton & Co., and James Richardson & Sons, Inc. The Bonds will be direct and unconditional general obligations of the Hydro and Power Authority. Principal and interest will be unconditionally guaranteed by the Province of British Columbia and will be payable in New York City in U.S. dollars. Annual sinking fund payments commencing July 2, 1971, will retire 50% of the issue prior to maturity. Purchases of the Bonds by United States persons will not be subject to the Interest Equalization Tax."

In the busiest new issue market in the annals of Wall Street, the foregoing announcement last week caused barely a ripple of interest. On the previous day, after all, Louisville Gas & Electric Co. accepted a bid which represented the highest return on Triple-A utility obligations in a half-century. Next day Fannie May offered the first instalment—\$530 million worth—of loan participation certificates, novel and controversial government securities priced to yield up to an unprecedented 5.75%. Despite its distant origins and relatively small size, however, the B.C. Hydro and Power Authority issue rates at least a footnote to financial history. For it points up one of the Street's most unfortunate failings, its willingness to do business with men one can't trust.

On this score British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority, as a creature of the Provincial government, eminently qualifies. A half-decade ago this government, headed then as now by the Honorable W.A.C. Bennett, leader of the Social Credit Party, launched the Authority through the simple expedient of seizing the British Columbia Electric Co. After years of litigation, during which the B.C. Supreme Court ruled that Premier Bennett had acted illegally on every count, the Province and the utility finally reached a settlement. From a bad beginning the Authority is moving steadily toward a dubious end. In view of the restraints on investment, domestic and foreign, now being urged on private enterprise in the U.S. and Canada alike, this is a curious moment to pursue a huge and costly project. Even in the best of times, as the prospectus neglects to point out, the Peace River development which the new bonds will help to finance would strike most observers as highly speculative. Power, as Lord Acton once said, corrupts. He should have lived to see public power.

It's quite a sight. On the U.S. side of the border stand such monuments to lack of principle as the obsolete nuclear power station at Hanford, Wash., as well as the illegally financed generating plant of the Colorado-Ute Electric Association (Barron's, page 21). Now a project is rising north of the border, which—for size, cost and potential waste of resources—will dwarf anything on the continent. Portage Mountain Dam on the Peace River, some 600 miles north of Vancouver, will boast an ultimate capacity

of 2,270,000 kilowatts, several hundred thousand more than Grand Coulee, currently the largest in the world. Including three storage dams planned under the Columbia River Treaty, the B.C. Hydro and Power Authority has blueprinted total capital outlays of \$1.36 billion for the next half-decade. According to the prospectus for the forthcoming offering, which constitutes merely the first round. "The Authority expects to obtain the \$932 million balance of the capital funds required by borrowing approximately two-thirds of that balance from Provincial Government investment accounts and the remainder from other investors."

While bursting with statistics, the prospectus is something less than a model of full disclosure. For example, it scants the protracted dispute between the Authority and the original owner of the properties, the British Columbia Electric Co. The issue arose in mid-1961, when a bill to expropriate B.C. Electric was passed in record time. Literally, overnight, as Barron's observed, a century-old private concern became an agency of the Crown. "The speed of the move," we went on, "was matched by its highhandedness. In a previous case, an impartial tribunal, after weighing such factors as future earning prospects and replacement costs, fixed the compensation. Here, in contrast, the price was decreed, solely on the basis of paid-in capital by the government itself, with no provision for appeal . . . The terms are patently unfair to most stockholders. In the view of the Dominion's financial community, which has denounced them as 'arbitrary, unfair and inconsistent with the Canadian tradition of equity and legal recourse' such terms smack less of expropriation than of confiscation."

The Supreme Court of British Columbia agreed. In July of 1963 it declared the enabling act unconstitutional. The court added that the takeover price of \$172 million, which purported to be "full, fair and adequate compensation," was too low. B.C. Electric finally settled with the Province for \$197 million.

Water over the dam, some may say. However, in view of the large sums of private capital—all guaranteed by Victoria—which the Authority hopes to raise, surely the past is worth recounting. As to the future, the prospectus sheds equally dim light. For example, it nowhere breaks down total scheduled investment between the three Columbia River dams, two of which will generate neither electricity nor profits, and the Peace River project itself. It makes no effort to suggest where the power ultimately will go, or at what price or cost. Queried about markets last week, the Authority told Barron's it expects to sell its output primarily in British Columbia, with any surplus ticketed for the Bonneville Power Administration. However, in view of the huge projected increase in kilowatts (Portage Mountain Dam will more than double present Provincial generating capacity), the competition likely from new discoveries of oil and gas (Rainbow Lake), and the declining cost of nuclear power, the confidence of the Peace mongers may prove misplaced. As to the U.S., the Pacific Northwest, according to private utilities, will not lack for power in the Seventies.

If the past and future look murky, the present is clear. B.C. Hydro and Power Authority, the prospectus shows, operates like anything but a business. Its railroad and transit operations run at a loss. Since taking over from B.C. Electric, it has steadily reduced rates, notably to residential users, at the expense of profits. In the 1962 fiscal year, the Authority showed a net income of \$16.3 million on aggregate revenues of \$133 million; last year, in striking contrast, on \$160 million it earned only \$7.5 million. In short, a 20% increase in gross has gone hand-in-hand with a 55% drop in net.

In some circles, to be sure, such results are praiseworthy. Thus, the Northwest Public Power Association last Spring presented British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority with the Paul J. Raver Award for Community Service. After listing its achievements, the Citation reads: "The annals of the electric utility industry have never recorded so much progress in so little time." On both sides of the border, what former President Eisenhower labelled creeping socialism lately has been making a great leap forward. Wall Street should be the last to underwrite its advance.

 VIETNAM

(Mr. WAGGONNER asked and was given permission to extend his remarks in the body of the RECORD and to include an editorial.)

Mr. WAGGONNER. Mr. Speaker, I have spoken a number of times about the failure of the news media to carry to the people the full story of our operation in Vietnam. I am pleased now for the opportunity to say that one paper I know of has no hesitancy to speak up on this vitally important side of our operation there. The Shreveport Times carried an editorial on June 18 which expresses my view exactly and I think it is important that other Members have a chance to see it also.

THAT OTHER WAR

What the average American hears from Viet Nam usually concerns one of two things—combat operations against the Communists or the latest political upheaval in Saigon.

But there's a third story about Viet Nam that ought to be told and that is what America is doing, amid the chaos of war and political turbulence, for the people of South Viet Nam.

Most people are not aware that swarms of Americans are out working in the Vietnamese countryside; not fighting, but rebuilding what has been lost in the war; building things like schools and clinics that Viet Nam never had.

Literally hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese people have been treated by American medical teams, not for war wounds but for ailments like round-worms and beriberi.

What's more, nearly every American defense perimeter has a military clinic—and it serves not only U.S. and Vietnamese troops but Vietnamese men, women and children. At the great Marine base of Da Nang, for instance, Marine doctors not only patch GI's but attend to Vietnamese villagers—many of them kids—who sleep right alongside armed leathernecks.

Politically, American forces are trying to teach the people some representative democracy at the grassroots, in the villages and provinces. The idea is to build a viable, free-working political structure from the ground up. If Viet Nam does ever have a really free election, this kind of American work will pay off.

These positive American efforts to help all the Vietnamese people are not very often emphasized. Here we confess to puzzlement. The administration, it seems, could go a long way toward building up public confidence in what we are doing in Viet Nam by publicizing our non-war efforts.

For the truth is that Americans are fighting two wars in Viet Nam. We can win and are winning the military war. We also are trying to win a war against disease, poverty and ignorance. We cannot be victorious in just one of these two struggles; both must be won if a real peace is to come to Viet Nam.

HORTON RECOGNIZES ANNIVERSARY OF EAST BERLIN UPRISING

(Mr. HORTON asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to revise and extend his remarks and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. HORTON. Mr. Speaker, June 17 marked the 13th anniversary of the East Berlin uprising. While the House of Representatives was not in session on that day, I feel it is fitting at this time to recognize this significant event in man's fight for freedom and to honor the memory of those who participated in it.

The entire world was aroused by the incidents which took place behind the Iron Curtain on June 17, 1953. Even today freemen continue to marvel at the revolt which took place in East Berlin causing the Russian Government serious embarrassment and clearly demonstrating to the world how cruel and heartless the commissars and their puppet East Germans could be.

Though under Russian occupation, the East Berliners, nevertheless did not lose sight of progress and improved living conditions made by their countrymen in the Western sector. Those in the East were aware of the propaganda which the Soviets were feeding them, and when the hated dictator Stalin died in March 1953, the people of East Berlin felt that here was their chance to public dissatisfaction with their living conditions and lack of political freedom. Thus on June 17 began the heroic, but short-lived revolt which the Russians brutally put down. Many brave men and women were caught up in the Russian retaliation and paid the supreme sacrifice—their lives. The example of their courage was not lost, however, and a few years later a similar revolt broke out in Hungary. Clearly the Soviet Union's Iron Curtain was being splintered and much of the credit belongs to the gallant people of East Berlin who defied the goliath of the Communist world.

That Soviets and East Germans still fear the East Berliners' quest for freedom is obvious with the construction in 1962 of the infamous Berlin wall. What further indictment of communism's failure is required than for it to feel obliged to wall a large segment of its people in?

Mr. Speaker, it is possible that those East Berliners of the June 17 revolt never dreamed that its repercussions would still be felt in this year 1966. But to their credit the regime of the East must either institute more repressive means to stifle dissent or grant the people more generous measures of freedom and equality. Time will judge what they choose. But time cannot erase the role played by those participants of the June 17 movement who struck a blow for freedom, the effects of which are still clearly evident.

DEMOCRATS: THE HIGH INTEREST RATE PARTY

(Mr. CURTIS (at the request of Mr. BUCHANAN) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. Speaker, I was appalled the other day to see \$530 million of federally owned mortgages offered at an interest rate of 5.75 percent and a great loss to the Government. This sale further tightened an already tight money situation and exerted further pressures toward high interest rates. It also diverted funds from the savings and loan industry and the housing market, further compounding the problems in those areas. I think we can now truly call the Democrat Party the "high interest rate party." It is particularly alarming that also involved is a deceptive effort to cover up excessive deficit spending for more mismanaged Great Society programs. Under unanimous consent I insert an article from the Wall Street Journal of June 17 describing this situation:

THE TANGLED WEB

When officials first planned to step up sales of Government-owned mortgages to private investors, they were sure they had a good idea, but by now they should be having their doubts.

The Administration arguing for the sales, could picture itself as a foe of Big Government; after all, wasn't it substituting private for public credit? True, in a sense: Private investors indeed will be collecting the interest on the loans. The mortgages remain Federally insured, though, so the Government still assumes most of the risk.

Aside from principle, the sales had their practical aspects. By disposing of a lot of mortgages, the expenditure side of the administrative budget, as well as the deficit, could be reduced. And that would leave room, on paper anyway, for more Great Society programs. Of course it was a little deceptive, but how many voters understand the workings of high finance?

However many such well-versed voters there may be, quite a few members of the electorate plainly don't care much for high interest rates. As evidence of that, a number of Democratic politicians have largely built their careers by campaigning for ever-low interest charges.

That being true, it must have been a little embarrassing to some people the other day when \$530 million of Federally owned mortgages were offered at an interest rate of 5.75%. It's a good bit more than the Government has to pay when it sells its own securities; several Republicans were quick to claim that the Democrats had now become the exponents of high interest rates.

The high rate also promises to divert funds from the savings and loan industry and the housing market, thus slowing their growth. While a little slower growth might be desirable after years of exuberance, you don't find many Democratic politicians saying so.

If they want to, the Democrats can point out that the Republicans also sold off plenty of mortgages during the Eisenhower Administration, but we don't think they will find this any great consolation. When you're stuck in a tangled web, it doesn't matter much who first began to weave it.

CRACKS IN THE FACADE OF ECONOMIC PROSPERITY

(Mr. CURTIS (at the request of Mr. BUCHANAN) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. Speaker, cracks are beginning to appear in the Nation's facade of economic prosperity. Over the past year, there has been a sharp re-

duction in the rate of increase of our standard of living as a result of higher taxes and price inflation.

The Wall Street Journal on June 21, 1966, pointed out that between the second and third quarters of 1965 "real" income per capita grew \$47. The increase fell to \$29 between the third and fourth quarters and to only \$13 between the fourth quarter and the first quarter of 1966.

The slowdown in the growth of per capita personal income adjusted for tax increases and rising prices is already having effects on the economic outlook. Unless checked, the growth of the economy itself will level off in the coming months. Even worse, inflation may continue or even accelerate. The decline in "real" spendable earnings will spur union leaders to make unusually large wage demands during the heavy bargaining that is scheduled for next year.

The slower growth of consumer purchasing power is already having its effects on the economy. The personal savings rate has fallen substantially in recent months, putting even more upward pressure on interest rates that already are at historically high levels. Retail sales also are increasing less rapidly than last year, while surveys of consumer buying plans indicate a leveling off of purchases in the coming months.

In an inflationary environment such as exists today, this news should draw some cheers. Indeed, this would be the case if it were the result of a conscious effort by Government to reduce excessive demand by reducing or deferring non-essential civilian spending.

Today, however, inflationary excesses themselves are braking economic growth and, at the same time, creating pressures for inflationary wage demands next year. If military spending is then increased in the face of an emerging wage-price spiral, the Johnson administration will face a Hobson's choice of its own making. It will be forced to permit galloping inflation, apply harsh and painful monetary and fiscal restraints or seek authority to impose wage-price controls. No matter what the policy choice, the American people will lose.

The situation that is building up today is what the minority members of the Joint Economic Committee warned against in their annual views contained in the committee's 1966 annual report on the Economic Report of the President. In that report, we said that failure by the administration to take timely and effective action against inflation would lead to a recession next year.

Since then, the administration has followed a policy of drift and delay, relying largely on the wage-price guideposts. The guideposts, however, have proven not only ineffective, but they came under such sharp attack from economists that they are now all but dead and buried.

Except for the increase in payroll and excise taxes and the change in the withholding schedule, the administration has put the burden for fighting inflation squarely on the shoulders of the Federal Reserve. As the minority of the Joint